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Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
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## **MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES**

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### **TITLE:**

**The Role and Values of Combat Leadership in Modern Warfare:  
Can Combat Leadership and Personal Leadership Skills Be Replaced by Modern  
Technology?**

### **AUTHOR:**

**Major Jan Helge Dale / Norwegian Army High Readiness Force / Telemark Battalion  
USMC Command & Staff College**

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Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Donald E. Bittner, Ph.D. Professor of History  
Approved: *Donald E. Bittner*  
Date: *29 April 2011*

Oral Defense Committee Member: John W. Gordon, Professor of National Security Affairs  
Approved: *John W. Gordon*  
Date: *29 April 2011*

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## **Executive Summary**

**Title:** The Role and Values of Combat Leadership in Modern Warfare. Can Combat Leadership and Personal Leadership Skills Be Replaced by Modern Technology?

**Author:** Major Jan Helge Dale, Norwegian Army High Readiness Force, Telemark Battalion.

**Thesis:** Technology can provide commanders at all levels with useful information tools to increase their situational awareness, make sound decisions, and communicate these decisions more quickly and clearly to their subordinate units and commanders, but an overreliance on sophisticated Command, Control, and Information Systems (C2IS) will be counterproductive.

**Discussion:** Although the technological innovation of command, control and information systems has provided military units with tools to increase the speed and accuracy in the decision making process, and conduct complex operations in a controlled and safer way than before, the role of commanders and the role of leadership are even more important than ever. The complexity of the modern battlefield and the speed which decisions have to be taken, makes the presence of commanders in the situations vital. The ability to gain situational understanding, accept uncertainty, and take intuitive decisions requires strong and dynamic leadership skills. More distributed operations will make it impossible for the commander to be everywhere at the same time. A command and control system is required based upon mission command, which again requires mutual trust and understanding build on personal relationship, the ability to accept personal initiative on a lower level, and the ability to accept chaos and solutions outside the plan as long as it support the purpose. Thus, the leadership element of the command and control system is more important than ever before, commanders must be selected and trained with this in mind, and units must be given time to establish proper personal relationships before they are deployed on missions.

**Conclusion:** Technology is just a tool in order to help commanders and organizations to conduct mission command. Because people are the most important element within every military force, strong combat leadership is crucial to overcome the fog of war. Good leaders can perform with poor technology, but poor leaders can fail even with the best technology available.

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### *Preface*

This paper is written as a Master of Military Studies requirement at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College during the academic year of 2010 – 2011. Its intent is to focus on the importance of strong and dynamic leadership even as technological developments and more sophisticated Command and Control (C2) equipment evolves. I strongly believe that technology can provide commanders at all levels with useful information tools to increase their situational awareness, make sound decisions, and communicate these decisions more quickly and clearly to their subordinate units and commanders. I also believe that technology can provide sound and effective control systems that make it possible to decrease the possibility of accidental friendly fire. However, I am especially concerned that an overreliance on sophisticated Command, Control, and Information Systems (C2IS) will be counterproductive.

The battlefield as we know it from previous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is more complex than ever before. To deal with this complexity **we must establish Command and Control systems that are based upon mission intent, mutual thrust, and personal relations.** Thus, some leadership skills are universal and can never be replaced by technology. In this paper I shall discuss why it is still necessary to invest time and effort in educating and training military personnel in traditional commandership and leadership. This is true even though the technological innovation has made it possible for commanders to remove themselves even further from the frontline in order to monitor and direct the battle through sophisticated Command and Control systems.

I fully recognize that there is a difference between the sergeant and the general. Therefore, I will focus on the level of independent company, battalion, and regimental commanders. The reason for this is dual. Firstly, because at this level commanders have the

option to conduct both distributed and one-scene leadership. Secondly, because I am Norwegian and so far the Norwegian armed forces have not deployed larger units than company and battalion sized combat teams into combat operations.

This paper is divided into four different parts. Part one will describe the evolution of warfighting and the impact that has had on Command and Control. It will also describe the timeless nature of war, and how this has led to *principles of war* and developed *warfighting functions*. Then it will deal with Command and Control's relationship to the other five warfighting functions, to include a description of the aims and basis of the Command and Control system. Part two deals with leadership as an element of the Command and Control system, especially with different aspects of mission command and combat leadership. Part three will focus on technology. It describes the objective for Command, Control, and Information systems, and what technology can both bring to the fight but also what dangers may arise by over focusing on it. Part four deals with selection and training of leaders and units in order to be able to carry out mission command.

This paper selects primarily American, British, German, Norwegian, and Israeli historical examples and sources. It also has looked into American, British, Norwegian, and NATO doctrines. For leadership theories and research about mental reactions, I have mainly used American and Norwegian sources and research. In addition to historical examples I have also discussed the issues in this paper with several highly qualified and experienced company and battalion commanders from the same countries from which I mainly have drawn sources. The results from this survey are gathered in Appendix C, and also commented throughout the paper. Some of the answers are in Norwegian. These are not translated but kept in original language.

There are individuals to whom I must express my appreciation for their assistance in researching and writing this paper. First of all I need to thank my mentor, Dr. Donald F. Bittner, who has answered my questions with great patience and knowledge. I am also very grateful to my wife, Camilla Karola Miranda Dale, who has helped me with her own methodical experience from her own research and academic writing. Finally, I also must thank all of those who have answered my questions, and with whom I have had extensive discussions on this subject. Those 21 officers are highly experienced and qualified to comment on both combat leadership and Command and Control issues, and have provided a very valuable contribution to the depth in this paper.

## ***Introduction***

During the last century the battlefield has changed dramatically. From moving in closed formations in confined battlespaces, units are now maneuvering dispersed and the fires are concentrated. This has resulted from the increased lethality and the precision of long range weapons, and coupled with enhanced communications. But other changes have also occurred. The conventional war as known from the mid twentieth century is gone. The modern battlefield as seen in 21<sup>st</sup> century wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are characterized by an enemy fighting an irregular war, far more distributed operations than before, and numerous multinational and interagency actors. This has also changed the ways command and control is executed by commanders in the direction of mission command and by the placement of more authority down to subordinate junior leaders.

Command and control are described in MCDP 6 (Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication) as the most important of all the six warfighting functions (Command and control, Maneuver, Fires, Intelligence, Logistics and Force Protection).<sup>1</sup> This makes sense because there will be no effect on either maneuver or fires if there is no command and control function directing them. On the other hand, command and control gives no effect without the other functions. The role of command and control are therefore an integrated link to the other five warfighting functions.<sup>2</sup> All together they focus the effort and create effect.

The overall objective for the command and control system is to increase the situational awareness, give the commander a picture from where he or she can make fast and sound decisions, and communicate these to subordinate commanders in a quick, timely, and understandable way. The command and control system should try to generate speed by making the decision making cycle (OODA loop, see discussion on page 7) works as fast as possible.<sup>3</sup> Its goal is to ensure the right person receives the right information at right time.<sup>4</sup>

Also, according to MCDP 6, leadership is of essential importance because people are the single most important element of the command and control system.<sup>5</sup> Leadership in combat is challenging and stressful. This occurs because of uncertainty (no commander will ever have complete knowledge of a situation), the need for tempo in the decision making cycle, and because people in combat situations are influenced by mental reactions. Those reactions are a part of what Clausewitz refers to as *the fog of war*, and create the friction that always will occur in a combat situation. People view the situation different, communication and orders might not always be crystal clear, intelligence is imprecise, and people are influenced by mental stress that make them act different than expected.

There have been developments in the theory and practice of command, and in command and control systems. The character of modern warfare has introduced mission command as an overall leadership principle. However, **the timeless elements of leadership will remain important independent of the developments on the technical and tactical levels.** Because conflict involves human beings, personal relations, situational understanding, and intuitive decision making, dynamic leadership will still be the key element in warfighting.

The ongoing technological innovation of command, control, and information systems can, if used properly, give the command and control system enhanced capabilities. The aim of all these systems must be to increase the speed in the decision making cycle by increasing situational awareness and make it easier to communicate. Technology, however, has some shortfalls that must be taken into consideration. Battlefield Management (BMS) and Information Systems (IS) can increase situational awareness, but there is a distinct difference between situational awareness and situational understanding. The first can be achieved through information and pictures given by other means, but the latter are based upon on sight impressions of the situation (see discussion at page 15). The next shortfall is the danger of micromanagement that is counterproductive in a command and control system based upon

mission command. Thus, technology can provide some advantages if used properly, but it can also produce damage if misused.

Technological innovation of command, control, and information systems has provided military units with tools to increase the speed and accuracy in their decision making process while conducting complex operations in a controlled and safer way. Still, the role of commanders and the associated leadership are even more important than ever before. The complexity of the modern battlefield and the speed with which decisions have to be taken makes the presence of commanders in a situation vital. The ability to gain situational understanding, accept uncertainty, and make intuitive decisions requires strong and dynamic leadership skills.

However, distributed operations (Appendix D) make it impossible for the commander to be everywhere at the same time. This requires a command and control system based upon mission command, which in turn requires mutual trust and understanding built on personal relationships. Thus, this requires that seniors accept personal initiative at a lower level, and have the ability to accept chaos and solutions outside an original plan as long as these subordinate actions support the mission accomplishment. Because leadership element of the command and control systems is thus more important than ever, hence commanders must be selected and trained with this in mind. Then, units must be given time to establish the necessary personal relationships before they are deployed on missions.

### *Command and Control*

The nature of warfighting is universal even though the environment develops in accordance with the technological evolution. The nature of warfighting is based upon human beings, their will to use force, and how they are influenced by force and incidents. Events could be accidental, but are most often a result of a decision, which will in next evolution

have influence on other decisions. Clausewitz compares warfare with a duel between two human beings, just at another level, where actions and counteractions are following each other.<sup>6</sup> Command and control should give flexibility and energy in such an environment characterized by friction and uncertainty.

### **Development of Modern Warfare from a Command and Control Perspective.**

When General Robert E. Lee launched his final attack on 3 July 1863 during the battle of Gettysburg, he attacked with two divisions across an open field of 1500 yards.<sup>7</sup> The distance between the two divisions was not more than 1000 yards. Supported by artillery his brigades marched in closed ranks towards Cemetery Ridge until at 200 yards the Army of the Potomac were within the range of their rifles (Appendix A-1).

126 years later, on the morning of 24 February 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf, launched his ground operation into Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. He initiated the attack during nighttime. Supported by massive and precise indirect fire support from naval ships, aircraft, and artillery, his ground forces swept in scattered formations across the Kuwaiti desert. In this attack his forces were able to quickly mass fire accurate on enemy formations (Appendix A-2).

During these 126 years there had been a major evolution of warfighting capability based on new weapon systems, technology, and tactics. Although the introduction of the machine gun, main battle tanks, and aircraft all had influence on the conduct of warfare, it is the increased lethality, range, and precision targeting of weapon systems, and the improvement of command and control systems that are most important in this context. Those factors have totally changed the battlefield from closed and narrow formations engaged in close quarter combat, to scattered formations which maneuver on the battlefields of vast

dimensions and are capable of massing fires. Fire and maneuver has changed from being a small unit tactic to being conducted by battalions and brigades.

But the changes did not stop there. Desert Storm was so far the last major conventional war. Recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have confronted coalition forces (CF) with other challenges. After the conventional phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom was over, the operation went into a stabilization operation. The enemy fought an irregular war, using small unit tactics and hiding amongst the people.<sup>8</sup> This significant shift brought back the character of many wars since 1945.

The media also plays an increasingly more important role in providing the public with a more or less timely superficial picture of situations on the battlefield. The number of actors involved is also increasing, not only interagency (IA) but also coalition forces (CF) and host nation security forces (HNSF). From being linear, the battlefield is now being conducted in a 360 degrees direction and in what is called the three block war (3BW) or four block war (4BW). This means that soldiers can find themselves in an intense firefight, while they almost at the same time are doing humanitarian assistance (HA), stability and support operations (SASO), and information operations (IO). Being able to mentally shift gears from one situation to another is a challenge that demands much of both leaders and subordinates. It also requires that soldiers and small units are able to act independently within the intent of the mission. The wars that military units are preparing to fight are characterized by an invisible enemy, many actors, and distributed operations. The counterinsurgency (COIN) operations of today are different from the conventional wars fought only one or two decades ago, e.g. Desert Storm (1991), or the initial wars of liberation in the post World War II era (decolonization).

Ten years after Desert Storm American troops became involved in another war in Afghanistan. But the 600 men of Task Force Dagger faced a totally different environment during the offensive towards Kabul and Kandahar in the late autumn of 2001,<sup>9</sup> and during Operation Anaconda towards the Pakistani border early winter 2002. Spread out through the entire northern area of that country in order to directly attack the Taliban and Al Qaeda through the Northern Alliance, and assist them with air support, they were conducting highly distributed operations (Appendix A-3).

### **Warfighting and the Nature of War.**

Despite the significant change in the way warfighting has been conducted, some aspects of conflict and war are timeless. Warfighting changes in accordance with the environment in which wars are waged, but the nature of war is timeless. Therefore, there are timeless *principles of war*<sup>10</sup> and *warfighting functions* (see discussion below). War is not a fight between weapons and equipment, which are just tools. War is a fight between people. It is a fight between two or more independent and adaptable human wills. It is a struggle to overcome uncertainty, chaos, and human reactions better than the opponent. Carl von Clausewitz describes the nature of war, noting that ultimately war: “*is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.*”<sup>11</sup>

NATO refers to the following *Combat Functions* in AJP-3.2: “*Command, Maneuvre, Firepower, Protection, Information and Intelligence, and Combat Service Support.*”<sup>12</sup> The United States Marine Corps describes six mutual integrated *Warfighting Functions* in MCDP 1.0: “*Command and Control, Maneuver, Fires, Intelligence, Logistics, and Force protection.*”<sup>13</sup> The United States Army also describes six *Warfighting Functions* in FM 3-0: “*Movement and maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, Command and Control, and Protection.*”<sup>14</sup> The Norwegian Army, like NATO, uses seven *Combat Functions* in its

Doctrine for Land Warfare: “*Maneuver Fire support, Intelligence, Protection, Air Defense, Logistics, and Command.*”<sup>15</sup>

With some slight differences in sequence all of them identify the same conceptual functions, and all of them notify these as integrated. MCDP 6 describes Command and Control as the most important of the Warfighting functions.<sup>16</sup> Hence, the issue is that they are integrated. Command and Control will never win a single battle on its own, but without Command and Control the other functions will have limited effect. While the other functions can stand alone, command and control is the integrated part of all of them, gives them effect and, most importantly, directs them and ensures combined effort.

### **Command and Control in War.**

Because war always is a fight between two or more independent human wills, there always will be human reactions such as fear, anger, exhaustion, initiative or lack of initiative, bad or good behavior, and different understandings of orders and situations. These are all part of the threat or use of violence. The enemy will be unpredictable and smart, and as a result of that the battlefield will be dynamic and characterized with a high amount of reactions and counteractions occurring simultaneously. Time and the ability to overcome uncertainty are vital in this fight. The side able to launch directed actions more quickly than the enemy and exploit the outcome of these actions will gain the initiative and have an enhanced chance to win the fight. Carl von Clausewitz describes this environment of uncertainty and action as:

War is the real of uncertainty; three quarter of the factors on which action in war is based is wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty...The commander must work in a medium which his eyes cannot see; which his best deductive powers cannot always fathom; and with which, because of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar.<sup>17</sup>

There are two principal directions to deal with uncertainty: either accept and function with it, or try to gather enough information to minimize it. Martin van Creveld describes this as follows:

Confronted with a task, and having less information available than is needed to perform the task, an organization may react in either of two ways. One is to increase its information-processing capacity, the other to design the organization, and indeed the task itself, in such a way as to enable it to operate on the basis of less information. These approaches are exhaustive; no others are conceivable. A failure to adopt one or the other will automatically result in a drop in the level of performance.<sup>18</sup>

The overall objective for the Command and Control system is to increase the situational awareness so as to give the commanders a picture from where he or she can make fast and sound decisions. Once these are made, they must be quickly communicated down to subordinate commanders in an understandable way in order to transfer them into actions against the enemy. This decision making cycle is known as the OODA loop (Appendix B-1). Speed in the loop is essential in order to take and maintain the initiative. The majority of the answers in the survey for this paper also stress that the human aspect is the most important part of the Command and Control system (Appendix C-2, Question 2).

Situational awareness is all about giving the right person the right information in right time. But using a long time to gather information can provide the enemy with the opportunity to gain the initiative. The goal for those within a Command and Control system is therefore to try to act with as little information as possible (i.e. accepting uncertainty and stress) and thereby accept and overcome a high degree of uncertainty (and assume a superiority over the enemy).

### *Leadership in Combat*

If warfighting is, as Clausewitz postulated, a duel between two opposing wills, then the core elements in warfighting are to make effective decisions as quickly as possible and ensure that these are executed. The key question is therefore how to achieve effective military decisions and transfer them into execution. This is the objective for the whole Command and Control process, and all elements of the system should contribute to this end state. The objective is never a well running command and control process of and by itself, but effective military action.

#### **Leadership as an Element of the Command and Control System.**

The command and control system is composed of both human and technological elements. The human element is the communication and interaction between people; this means the ability to establish situational understanding, to make decisions, and to translate these decisions into effective and appropriate actions. The technological elements are the tools and equipment that support the human element. Because people are the most important element of a Command and Control system, strong and effective leadership is thus essential.<sup>19</sup> The importance of strong leadership is also commented in the cited surveys (Appendix C-2, Question 1 and 2).

In a civilian company or in armed forces in peacetime, leadership is also of high importance but the environment within which those leaders perform is different than that faced by leaders in combat situations. In peacetime the speed in the decision making cycle does not play as essential a role. Because speed is less a critical element, it is possible to build a sufficient picture of the situation before decisions have to be made. Even if under pressure and stress, it is not comparable to what leaders confront in a combat situation; in the latter situation commanders have to accept uncertainty and still make decisions because there

is limited time to gain absolute or sufficient situational awareness. They must trust that their subordinates to have sound judgment because they are not able to be up front themselves, and they must ensure that decisions are being executed quickly and effectively even if they have to deal with people that face all kinds of mental reactions caused by combat. There is thus an important difference between peacetime management and combat leadership. However, there is an important connection between these two environments; it is in peacetime that the training and cohesiveness occur that makes units win battles.

### **How Can the Commander Execute Command and Control in Combat?**

During several of the offensives on the Western Front in World War I, the Allied forces almost broke through the German defense line. But due to centralized Command and Control structure they lacked the initiative up front to exploit the break through (Appendix A-4). This must be compared to the Germans who had lesser resources but had success with a decentralized Command and Control system in 1918 (see comments below, page 11 and 12). It is interesting to note that later in 1918 the British forces adapted and succeeded with a more decentralized Command and Control system.

Nearly eight decades later, when Brigadier Patrick Cordingly attacked with the British 7<sup>th</sup> Armored Brigade, The Desert Rats, through the Kuwaiti Desert he fully understood that he could not control everything. He had given his subunits tasks and purposes, then he had to trust his subordinate commanders' judgment and abilities to coordinate between each other. His subordinate commanders gave him continuously situation reports and, with his eleven-man strong forward Brigade Command Post, he tried to place himself where he could best support and influence the decisive battles (Appendix A-2). Of course there has also been a technological revolution that made this possible, but the core reason for the success was the use of mission command.

These two examples show two principally different methods for conducting command and control. The first one was centralized and the commander conducted both command and control. The second was more decentralized. The commander still executed command, but the control function was based on communication and feedback (Appendix B-2). The last method is far more flexible and allows subordinate commanders to react to changing situations without waiting for orders. In other words, this method will generate a higher tempo in the decision making cycle. However, there are inherent implications: in order to implement it the commander must know and trust his subordinates, hence he or she must be willing to accept a higher degree of uncertainty for him or herself. He must accept that he cannot direct everything. Basic human nature might seek to control, but this must resisted this. This concept of Command and Control system is not new, but during the last decades it has been introduced as *Mission Command*. In almost every western country mission command is mentioned in doctrines and field manuals. Despite this, has this doctrinal approach become reality? In fact, not many armed forces are able or willing to fully conduct mission command operations. It is more than just an element of command and control; it is a leadership philosophy that an armed force must accept with its increasing effect on the entire military system. In the surveys the majority of the respondents stated the importance of decentralized leadership and mutual trust to succeed with a mission command system (Appendix C-2, Question 2).

### **Mission Command.**

Mission Command is the leadership philosophy related to maneuver warfare.<sup>20</sup> In theory it is quite simple. Its basis is to give the senior commander's intent and leave the detailed execution to subordinates. However, in practice it is more complicated than that. Technically, mission command focuses on giving task, purpose, and end state to the subordinates. There will also be some coordinating instructions such as timing, rules of

engagements, control measures, etc. and a task organization that allocates resources and priority. These orders are not detailed and they leave freedom of execution to the subordinates. Thereafter, the control function will appear as a continuously two-way communication between the commander and his subordinate commanders. Several of the answers in the survey emphasize that technology is just facilitator for mission command (Appendix C-2, Question 1 and 2).

The reason it is hard to fully implement mission command is that it is more than just a method of writing and giving orders. It is also more than a method for executing control in real world operations. It is a leadership philosophy that influences the entire military system, and it brings with it several requirements that need to be in place before it works. These are personal relationships, mutual trust, and situational awareness. Different nations have different approaches for this, but generally it is that a commander should understand the intent at least two levels up and be supporting the fight at least two levels down. For a company commander that means that he is involved in the planning process at least on battalion level, and is supporting and directing at squad level. Within that spectrum he should both know the people and the situation. To achieve mutual support he also needs to become involved with the other company commanders, and with other units that often are part of a battalion combat team. For the company combat team its commander must know all his supporting units and their capabilities.

To fully understand the implications of mission command, it could be useful to return to its roots. When General Alfred M. Grey and later General Victor Krulak introduced maneuver warfare to the US Marine Corps in the late 1980s,<sup>21</sup> they started with the Prussian and German military traditions.<sup>22</sup> They noted this leadership style could be traced all the way back to 18<sup>th</sup> century Prussia under Fredrick the Great. It is a command approach that is based upon mutual respect; it requires initiative and independence from subordinate commanders

but one which also demands a high degree of self-discipline. This leadership style was the basis for the establishment of small independent ranger (*jæger*) units, not unlike the command climate within most special operating forces have been raised and trained for decades. With the change in warfare toward more distributed an independent missions for general purpose forces, it could be argued that they also need to be raised and trained the same way.

During the stalemate on the Western Front in World War I, there were several attempts to return physical maneuver to the battlefield. Finally, in 1918, the Allies managed to do so by overwhelming new technology (aircrafts and battle tanks) and mass of forces. What is interesting is that in the spring of that year the Germans almost did the same with less resource. They used technical innovations such as the machine gun and the flame-throwers, specially selected and trained forces, and they massed the forces they had available and struck; this the main tactical innovation almost turned the war in their favor, and was called *Stormtrüper* tactics and the *Auftragstactic* (Appendix A-4). The most interesting part of this is that in contradiction to how the Allied forces conducted Command and Control, the Germans abandoned centralized control during their offensive while taking their best and most capable officers and moved forward in order to gain initiative.

### **Personal Relationship.**

When the Arab states attacked Israel in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the whole Israeli army was mobilized within a couple of days. At the Golan Heights one loosely formed battalion of the 7<sup>th</sup> Armored Brigade faced an entire Syrian armored corps. As soon as new units were mobilized, they were rushed to the front and were thrown into battle with Avidgor Kahalani's 77<sup>th</sup> Armored battalion. This was possible because of the personal relationship that existed between the officers within the Armored brigade (Appendix A-5).

Mission command is based upon personal relationships. Without subordinates knowing the commander, it would be difficult to really understand his intent. And for the commander, it would be difficult to read his subordinates without knowing them. Thus, this relationship should be established at two levels in both directions; however, it takes time to build this foundation for mission command. As operations become more distributed this personal relationship becomes even more important. With so many actions occurring simultaneously, commanders cannot be everywhere. He or she needs to choose where they most efficient can influence and support. Often based upon just having talked to his subordinates on the radio, he must judge the situation and decides where to place himself as well as on deciding on appropriate actions. During Operation Anaconda, in the Shaikot valley in eastern Afghanistan in February 2002, one of the reasons for friction was the lack of personal relationship within the chain of command. Forces were drawn from several different units without giving time for training and preparations, and the command structure was established only days before the operation was initiated (Appendix A-3).

Personal relationships also have another effect. It might be easier giving orders on the radio, but gathering the subordinates and have a face to face discussion might be more effective and increase both the understanding of the situation and the commander's intent. During the battle of Gettysburg, Robert E. Lee never gathered his three corps commanders together to coordinate the next day's attacks. This might be one of the reasons for the lack of support and coordination between his subordinate commanders during the decisive phases of the battle on 2 and 3 July 1863 (Appendix A-1).

### **Mutual Thrust.**

During the battle of Chancellorsville, the night before Stonewall Jackson's famous flanking attack, General Lee and Jackson met to discuss the opportunity that had suddenly appeared to strike the right flank of the Army of Potomac. The exchange between those two commanders, army and corps leaders, that night is an example of the confidence the senior had in his subordinate.<sup>23</sup> This confidence had several times made General Lee accept high risk in order to gain surprise and secure the initiative and helped Lee win tactical victories.

An essential effect of such personal relationships in leadership is the creation of confidence and trust. Trust has two advantages. First of all, it is necessary to give subordinates freedom and create opportunities for personal initiative within a command. Thereafter it also creates confidence and gives the commander confidence and belief in his own organization and makes him willing to take higher risks and accept uncertainty. In the survey personal relationship is mentioned by several former commanders who stress the importance of trust between commanders and subordinates in order to accept uncertainty and be willing to take risks (Appendix C-2, Question 2 and 3).

Trust, though, is mutual between the commander and his subordinates, up and down the chain of command. With rank and position comes a formal or organizational structure, but this is not what counts in building mutual thrust from a leadership/commandership perspective. Respect from the subordinates has to be earned. It is a direct result of dynamic and sound leadership, loyalty to the subordinates, and the way a leader approaches his tasks and takes care of his troops. Operation Anaconda, referred to above is also an example of how mutual trust makes things work out. All the commanders taking part in that operation had served together in the Ranger Regiment, and because of that they trusted each other.

## **Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding.**

Situational awareness is established as shown in Appendix B-3. There is a significant difference between *situational awareness* and *situational understanding*. To understand something is more than simply information given by others. In many situations it is necessary to have first hand observations and/or linked to personal experience. Information and assessments given by people that are trusted also give higher credibility than just raw information.

## **Intuitive Decision Making.**

In order to make a decision, commanders seek at least to gain knowledge about the problem before a decision is made. However, in combat there is very seldom time to gather enough information to eliminate all uncertainty or reduce it to minimum proportions. In that situation there are three options left for a decision making process. Either go forward and observe personally, trust the recommendations from the subordinates, or accept a degree of uncertainty and decide based on available information and experience. In a combat situation commanders are forced to make most of their decisions within a high degree of uncertainty. In these situations there are two different ways to make a decision. One is to analyze the situation, and the other to follow the intuition. Intuition also includes some sort of assessment, but instead of building primarily on raw materials and gathered information it is based upon first hand observations and impressions, knowledge of one's own units, the enemy and environment, personal experience from similar situations, and a feeling for what is going to happen. Intuitive leadership requires that the decision maker is close to the situation, at least mentally. Often this is more important at the brigade level and below than at higher levels of command where commanders have a broader view, more time, and better access to information. The answers in the survey point on that intuitive decision-making is based upon

experiences, assessment, and training. They also note that uncertainty must be accepted (Appendix C-2, Question 3).

### **Hero or Coward.**

This is the title of Elmar Dinter's book about pressures facing soldiers in battle.<sup>24</sup> Having to deal with uncertainty and violence thus creates mental and psychological reactions. Combat situations have a mental aspect that is hard to imagine before experiencing it. Thus, mental reactions such as fear, anger, uncertainty, and exhaustion are normal reactions and this must be recognized and accepted. These human responses have to be taken into consideration when decisions are made because they will influence execution. They can also influence on how people understand situations and orders. The skillful commander needs to be aware of the mental status of his subordinates so as to reduce psychological stress among them. Because leadership is about how to influence people and not about managing machines, it must be dynamic and in accordance with the situation.

### **Dynamic Leadership.**

After Operation Iron Triangle in Iraq 2006, Colonel Michael Dane Steel was criticized for having been too aggressive and disregarding for the rules of engagement after a sub-unit in his brigade conducted war atrocities. Without taking the discussion about to which degree Colonel Steel was guilty or not, it is important to note that he was an advocate for aggressive action and personal initiative in order to take care of his own soldiers. Aggressiveness and initiative are some of the key values for a military unit, but atrocities are devastating. Colonel Steel was criticized for addressing his soldiers as predators and the insurgents as the prey. Before Operation Karez in 2008 a Norwegian company commander used almost the same words when addressing his troops.<sup>25</sup> The meaning was the same, but the situation was different. A company commander can use those words because he has a closer personal

relationship with his troops than a brigade commander. Leadership has to be adjusted to the people lead, the situation, and the level. Only by a balanced and dynamic leadership and presence among the troops is it possible to ensure that the subordinates understand the intent and not translate it into how they understand the situation themselves. Hence, a commander must always be aware that friction will exist to include misunderstandings.

### **Moral Decision Making.**

Members of Colonel Steel's brigade have been charged with committing war crimes in Iraq. This was not in his intent, but because his strong leadership made some subordinates take his words as orders and acted accordingly. The same was the situation at Biscari in 1943 when General Patton's speech to the officers of 45<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was translated into an order to not take prisoners:

When we land against the enemy, don't forget to hit him and hit him hard. We will bring the fight home to him. When we meet the enemy we will kill him. We will show him no mercy. He has killed thousands of our comrades, and he must die. If you company officers in leading your men against the enemy find him shooting at you and, when you get within two hundred yards of him and he wishes to surrender, oh no! That bastard will die! You will kill him. Stick him between the third and fourth ribs. You will tell your men that. They must have the killer instinct. Tell them to stick him. He can do no good then. Stick them (sic) in the liver. We will get the name of killers and killers are immortal. When words reaches him that he is being faced by a killer battalion, a killer outfit, he will fight less. Particularly, you must build up that names as killers and you will get that that down to your troops in the time for the invasion.<sup>26</sup>

The situation is quite similar to Operation Iron Triangle. A strong commander, admired by his subordinates has had his words misinterpreted at a lower level in the chain of command. In the stress of combat people may be pushed towards the limit of moral behavior. In those situations personal leadership is crucial to avoid atrocities while making morally and legally correct decision. One of the lessons learned from the My Lai massacre in 1968 was the absence of proper leadership.<sup>27</sup> Mental reactions is obviously one of the triggers that should make commanders lead up front. On the answer to Question 4 and 5 in the survey several

officers commented that the presence of commanders is important to supervise and support, and had the effect of preventing undue stress and atrocities.

### **From Where to Command.**

A commander cannot be everywhere. But he should be conscious that his presence or lack of closeness will have an impact on a situation. From what is argued earlier, it is quite obvious that in order to achieve a mission command system the presence of commanders are important. However, there is a difference between a battalion commander and a division commander's presence up front. Different nations have different leadership doctrines. Much of these can be learned by looking how they organize their command posts and where they locate themselves.

#### *Technological development*

When LtCol John Dunford Slater launched his attack at the German barracks in the coastal town of Måløy during Operation Archery in December 1941, he placed himself with his first platoon and not in his forward command post at the landing site. He did so in order to ensure radio communications to his forward platoons. His brigade commander, Brigadier Joseph Haydon, placed himself on board the British flagship together with the reserve, and had the ship maneuvered close up to the cliffs at the landing beach in order to support the ground force although he exposed the vessel to the naval battery further up the fjord. Both took an enormous risk but by doing so they ensured they could execute command, support their troops, and have situational understanding enough to take intuitive decisions (Appendix A-6).

## **The Objective for Technological Command and Control Systems.**

The ongoing technological innovation of command, control, and information system can, if used properly, enhance a commander's command and control. The aim of all those system must be to increase the speed of the decision making cycle by increasing the situational awareness and make it easier to communicate with other commanders, both seniors and subordinates (Appendix C-2, Question 1).

### **Technological Shortfalls.**

However, there are some negatives with technology that must be taken into consideration. From the survey the most significant are information overload, micromanagement, and wrong picture of the situation. Battlefield management and information systems can increase situational awareness, but there is a distinct difference between situational awareness and situational understanding. The first can be achieved through information and pictures given by technological devices, but the latter are based upon on sight impressions of the situation. Also, there is the danger of micromanagement that can be counterproductive in a command and control system based upon mission command. Technology can give many advantages if used properly, but it can also cause damage if misused.

## *Selection and Training*

### **Selection and training of leaders.**

There are two principal ways to look upon leadership. The first one is that leadership is about knowledge and leaders can be educated. The second is that leadership is about personal skills and that leaders are born. Taken into consideration that mission command is about personal relationships, mutual trust, and intuitive decision making, it can be postulated

that personal and social skills are mandatory: the inherent ability to interact with other people, to motivate and generate enthusiasm, convey strong personal values, and a good sense of sound judgment. If so, then it can be fair to conclude that everyone can be educated to be managers, but only a few are born to be leaders. If this is true then proper selection and development of identified leaders is extremely important; it is more than simply just their education.

With that said education is also important because it develops knowledge and critical thinking after those natural leaders are identified. There is also a difference between education and experience. With the complexity of the modern battlefield experience indeed plays a very crucial role. Therefore, is it wise to put the youngest leaders in the most exposed positions before they gain experience and become confident? Or is it better to have at least company commanders that are older and more experienced, as opposed to younger but less experienced? Different nations have different policies on how much time officers are allowed to remain in company and battalion command. While US forces have captains as company commanders, it will normally be a major commanding a British or a Norwegian company or squadron.

### **Training of units.**

Taken into consideration that the most important foundation for mission command is personal relationships, units must have time to train together before deployment. With this commanders at all levels will have the opportunity to train with their unit and develop trust and confidence. They must not be bogged down in administrative matters. Several answers on the survey point out that the benefits by a well trained organization is that people are speaking the same language and understand each other (Appendix C-2, Question 3).

### ***Conclusions***

Technological innovation in command, control, and information systems have provided military commanders with tools to increase the speed and accuracy in the decision making process, and to facilitate the conduct of complex operations. In theory, this has made them more controlled and safe than before. None the less, the roles of commandership and leadership are even more important than ever. The complexity of the modern battlefield and the speed which decisions have to be taken makes the presence of commanders in the situations vital. The ability to gain situational understanding, accept uncertainty, and make intuitive decisions requires strong and dynamic leadership skills. However, more distributed operations make it impossible for the commander to be everywhere at the same time. This requires a command and control system based upon mission command, which requires mutual trust and understanding build on personal relationships, the ability to accept personal initiative at lower levels, and the ability to accept chaos and solutions different from an original plan as long as these support the achievement of the mission. The leadership element of the command and control system is more important than ever before, but commanders must be selected and trained with this in mind. Associated with this is another key factor: units must be given time to establish this personal relationship before they are deployed on missions.


Technology is just a tool in order to help commanders and organizations to conduct mission command. Because people are the most important element within every fighting organization, strong combat leadership is crucial to overcome the fog of war. Good leaders can perform with poor technology, but poor leaders can fail with the best technology available.

**Appendix A: Historically Examples**

**A-1: Pickett's charge at the Battle of Gettysburg.**

After the fighting at Gettysburg culminated at Devils Den, the Peach Orchard, the Wheatfield, and at Little Round Top on 2 July 1863, the Union Army reinforced its positions at Little Round Top, Cemetery Ridge, and Cemetery Hill, while the Confederate Army withdrew back into positions in the area of Seminary Ridge and Sprangler's Woods.<sup>1</sup> During the evening General George Meade held a council of war on the Union side.<sup>2</sup> General Robert E. Lee decided to launch a final attack the next morning against the center of the Union Army at Cemetery Ridge (figure 1<sup>3</sup>). The plan was a coordinated attack with James Longstreet's and A.P. Hill's divisions, supported by mass of fires from his artillery, against Cemetery Ridge, with a supporting attack from Ewell's divisions towards Culp's Hill. Despite the complexity of the attack, however, General Lee did not gather his corps commanders for face to face coordination. The attack failed due to bad timing and lack of coordination between the corps commanders.

**Figure 1:**  
Pickett's Charge In the Battle of  
Gettysburg




<sup>1</sup> Stephen W. Sears, *Gettysburg*, (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston/New York, 2004), p. 427.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 372.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 427.

## A-2: Operation Desert Storm, Kuwait 1991.

After almost 40 days of massive airstrikes and precision guided missile attacks against strategic targets within Kuwait and Iraq (Operation Desert Shield), the coalition forces launched their ground attack on the night of 23/24 February 1991 (Operation Desert Sword).<sup>4</sup> The aims of the air campaign were first and foremost to neutralize strategic important targets as the Iraqi Air Force, artillery and long range missiles, and armored formations. However, the air campaign was also intended to blind the Iraqi forces as Coalition Forces (VII US Corps) moved from east to west.<sup>5</sup> Operation Desert Storm started then with a deceptive attack in southeast as the Iraqi leadership had expected, while the main offensive was launched from the west by the XVIII US Airborne Corps and VII US Corps in order to bypass the Iraqi forces in Kuwait and cut off their retreat and supply routes across the Euphrates (figure 2<sup>6</sup>).




<sup>4</sup> Nigel Pearce, *The Shield and the Sabre: The Desert Rats in the Gulf 1990-91*, (HMSO, London, 1992), p. 77.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 89.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 90.

It was VII US Corps' role to attack into Kuwait from southeast Iraq and trap and neutralize the Republican Guard. The British 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division was to protect the Corps' vulnerable southeastern flank.<sup>7</sup> The objective for the British ground forces was to defeat the Iraqi tactical reserves between VII US Corps' southeastern flank and the Saudi-Iraqi border.<sup>8</sup> The arrowhead of the British ground forces was the Desert Rats, the British 7<sup>th</sup> Armored Brigade. The attack was carried out with such a tempo in its front that surrendering Iraqi forces were bypassed and left for following on forces (figure 3<sup>9</sup>). The Brigade commander, Brigadier Patrick Cordingley, led the attack from his own Challenger I MBT, supported with his staff in his forward command post (APC) totaling 11 men. The Brigade commander supervised, coordinated, and supported his subordinates but depended on sub unit coordination and independent action to keep up the speed of the advance.

**Figure 3:**  
**Desert Sabre 1991**



<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 90.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 90.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 98.

### A-3: Operation Enduring Freedom 2001-2002.

After the terrorist attack of 9/11, 600 Special Forces operators from Task Force Dagger made up the bulk of the US forces that together with the Afghan Northern Alliance freed Afghanistan from Taliban rule. One by one, the Afghan cities fell and Taliban fled towards south and east. The offensive towards Kabul and Kandahar was so fast and successful that COM CENTCOM, General Tommy Franks, fully believed that he would finally crush Taliban and Al Qaeda only by using SF and air power in support of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF). This success made him also reluctant to commit conventional forces to the fight. But the luck ended in a place called Tora Bora where the Al Qaeda leadership escaped due to lack of conventional forces, and in the Shaikot valley (Figure 4<sup>10</sup>) where conventional forces were used but all the principles of unity of command and preparations were violated before they were put into action. Only the personal relationship and mutual trust between the commanders of the different units, established through common service in the Ranger regiment, avoided greater chaos.<sup>11</sup>




Figure 4:  
Shaikot valley, February 2002

<sup>10</sup> Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda*, (Berkley Caliber Books, New York, 2005), p. 236.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, Ch. 16.

#### A-4: World War I: The Western Front.

During the stalemate on the western front, there occurred several attempts by both the German and the Allied sides to launch offensives. The aim of all these offensives was to break through the opponents defensive lines and restore the tactical mobility on the battlefield. The Allied forces almost broke through the German line several times by massing indirect fire power in advance of the ground attack, but even if they broke into the German line they were unable to exploit such success. This was due to centralized command and control and lack of freedom of action and initiative from frontline commanders, and the fact that the Germans established their defense in depth and had pockets of resistance that fought independently.<sup>12</sup> Finally, in 1918, the Allied forces managed to break through by overwhelming new technology (aircraft and battle tanks) and mass of forces. What is interesting is that only months earlier the Germans almost did the same with much fewer resources. They used technical innovations such as the machine gun and the flame-thrower, and massed the forces they had available, but the main tactical innovation that almost turned the war in their favor was the *Stormtrüper* tactics, and the *Auftragstactic*.

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<sup>12</sup> Bruce I. Gudmundson, *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918*, (Westport, CT. Praeger, 1995), p. 14-18.

#### A-5: Yom Kippur War 1973: The Golan Front.

When the Arab states attacked Israel in the Yom Kippur war in 1973 they caught IDF by surprise. Almost half the Israeli Army was on holiday and had to rush back to their units. Ultimately the whole Israeli army was mobilized within a couple of days, and even Israelis from outside the country were returning back home and join the mobilization of its reserve units.

On the Golan Heights the 7<sup>th</sup> Armored Brigade and the Barak Brigade, initially with no more than half of their original strength, had to face the attack from Syrian Armed Corps.<sup>13</sup> The first unit that faced the overwhelming Syrian force was Avigdor Kahalani's 77<sup>th</sup> Armored battalion. It rushed to the front and established defensive positions along the road from Damascus, on the top of what has been known as "the Valley of Tears", arriving just in time to stop the Syrian advance. For three days they fought a battle that if lost could threaten the existence of the State of Israel. Due to strong terrain, an excellent tactic of mobile defense, poor Syrian performance, and the fact that tank platoons and single tanks were thrown to the front in order to fill the ranks of damaged tanks as soon as their crews arrived back, the battalion succeeded. When the fighting ceased the battalion had only a handful tanks left, while the Syrians had lost more than 800 armored vehicles.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Avigdor Kahalani, *The Heights of Courage: a Tank Leader's War on the Golan*, (Greenwood Press, London, 1984), p. xi.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, Ch. 30.

#### **A-6: The Iraqi War: Operation Golden Triangle.**

In 2005 Colonel Michael Dane Steel deployed with 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (the Rakkasans) to Iraq. The next year they operated from a base outside Tikrit and into the region of Samara, which at that time was one of the areas where the insurgents were strongest.<sup>15</sup> 9 May 2006 they launched Operation Iron Triangle, with the aim to kill or capture Al Qaeda high value targets in the area of Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex in Samara. The operation failed and in one of the companies of the Brigade several situations of war atrocities occurred.<sup>16</sup> The brigade commander was subsequently accused of being too aggressive and focused on fighting instead of governance building and removed from his position.


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<sup>15</sup> Raffi Khatchadourian, "The Kill Company", (<http://raffikhatchadourian.com/killcompany.html>), p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

#### A-7: Operation Archery.

Early in the morning on the 27 December 1941 3 Commando from the 3 British Commando Brigade, supported by a small number of Norwegian Special Forces (Company Linge) from SOE, attacked the German garrison and factories in Måløy, a coastal town on the Norwegian west coast. Operation Archery became a great success that sent chock waves all the way to Berlin and made Hitler commit several hundred thousand troops to the defense of the Norwegian coastline. The operation was a success because of proper training and preparation in advance,<sup>17</sup> offensive leadership at brigade and battalion level, and the execution of mission type orders that gave junior leaders freedom of action and secured initiative and drive even though the severe resistance.<sup>18</sup> The ground commander, LtCol John Dunford Slater, placed himself with the first platoon and not in his forward command post at the landing site. He did this in order to ensure radio communications to his forward platoons during the heavy street fighting that occurred. His brigade commander, Brigader Joseph Haydon, placed himself on board the British flagship together with the reserve, and had the ship maneuvered close to the cliffs at the landing beach in order to support the ground force although this exposed the vessel to the naval battery further up the fjord (figure 5<sup>19</sup>).




<sup>17</sup> Joseph H. Devins Jr., *The Vaagso Raid*, (Chilton Book Company, Philadelphia, 1968), Ch. 8.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, Ch. 13.

<sup>19</sup> Christopher Buckley, *Norway – Commando – Dieppe*, (London, HMSO, 1952).


Appendix B: Figures

B-1: The OODA Loop.<sup>20</sup>



<sup>20</sup> MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, (Headquarters United States Marine Corps. 4 Oct 1996), p. 64.

B-2: Different types of Command and Control.<sup>21</sup>




A typical view of command and control—command and control seen as unidirectional.

Command and control viewed as reciprocal influence—command as initiation of action and control as feedback.

<sup>21</sup> MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, (Headquarters United States Marine Corps. 4 Oct 1996), p. 41.

### B-3: The Information Hierarchy.<sup>22</sup>



<sup>22</sup> MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, (Headquarters United States Marine Corps. 4 Oct 1996), p. 67.

## Appendix C: Survey.

### **Appendix C-1: Questions**

**Introduction:** This paper is written as a Master of Military Studies requirement at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College during the academic year of 2010 – 2011. The intent of this paper is to focus on the importance of strong and dynamic leadership even with technological developments and more and more sophisticated command and control equipment. I believe that technology can provide commanders at all levels with useful information tools to increase their situational awareness, make sound decisions, and communicate those decisions in a fast and clear manner to their unit or subordinates. I also believe that technology can provide sound and effective control systems that make it possible to decrease the possibility of friendly fire. I am concerned that an overreliance on sophisticated command, control and information systems will be counterproductive. The battlefield as we know it from previous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is more complex than ever before. To deal with this complexity we must establish command and control systems that are based upon mission intent, mutual trust, and personal relations. In my opinion, some leadership skills are universal and can never be replaced by technology. In this paper I will discuss why it is still necessary to invest a lot of time and effort into education and training of combat commanders, even though the technological situation will make it possible to remove commanders from the frontline and manage the battle through a laptop. In order to give this study more depth I will not only rely upon historical examples and theory, but also on the experience of highly skilled battalion and company commanders from different units and different nations.

**Title:** The Role and Values of Combat Leadership in Modern Warfare. Can combat leadership and personal leadership skills be replaced by modern technology?

**Thesis:** The modern day battlefield and technology makes it possible and necessary for commanders on all levels to increase their situational awareness. This also makes it possible for commanders to conduct distributed leadership. What are the shortfalls of battlefield management and what contribution will strong personal combat leadership still play?

#### **Q1. Technology and Command and Control:**

Do you think technology has any shortfalls in a Command and Control system built upon Mission Command?

#### **Q2: The Command and Control system:**

From your experience, what are the most important elements in a Command and Control system based upon mission command?

**Q3: Decision-making:**

From your perspective, how can uncertainty be decreased to an acceptable level without decreasing the ability to take decisions in time? How important are intuitive decision making in this matter?

**Q4: Leadership:**

From your perspective, does commanding a unit in combat situations require other skills than commanding a unit during peace time conditions?

**Q5: Combat Pressure**

Based upon your experience, what would you describe as normal combat reactions and how can leadership help overcome combat stress.

**Q6: Training and Preparations:**

How should individuals and units be recruited and trained in order to be able to execute mission command?

## Appendix C-2: Answers.

Q1 Do you think technology has any shortfalls in a Command and Control system built upon Mission Command?				
A101	Australia	Colonel Australian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander 1997-1998.  Infantry Battalion Commander 2004-2005.	Technology is only an enabler to mission command. The commander is central to the success of mission command. Even with poor systems an effective commander with well trained people can achieve mission command effects.
A102	Canada	Major Canadian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander Afghanistan 2008.	There will always be physical pitfalls in technology and pitfalls in the soldier using the technology. While technology may allow us to act faster we need to be careful not to use technology in ways that it wasn't intended. For example, because we can all look at the Predator feed doesn't mean the decision-making defaults to the person with the highest rank. Decision-making needs to remain with the person with the most relevant information and is in the best position to act upon that information. Conversely, technology allows us to better share information which ultimately enables mission command.
A103	France	Major French Army		The technology should be facilitators not create another charge for the commander.  The technology provides advantages for the momentum of the reports/orders distribution. Probably on the same time technology could lead to a tsunami of information at all levels, not necessary for the action. Technology could separate the chief from its Command and Control responsibilities (management).
A104	France	Major French Army		The main purpose of technology is to give the commander the situation of the units in real time so be able to plan, to react, to adapt. So technology is a facilitator at the HQ level but could easily be another, additional task for the commanders at the lowest level.  Systems need to be able to talk to each other: inter-services, tactical, operational, strategic level...  The technology provides advantages for the momentum of the reports and distributions of orders. However, the commander could have the feeling of being spied by the upper level of command. The upper level of command could also have the temptation to give orders directly, limiting the freedom of action of the commander.  Technology provides also a tsunami of information and few intel (exploited information).
105	The Netherlands	Lt Colonel Royal Netherland Marine Corps	CO Marine Training School.  CO Counter Terrorism Unit.	Military decision making will always have an element of uncertainty in it. The danger of increasing technology is that we are looking for 100% valid information on which we base our decision making. Even increasing technology will not give us 100% certainty. In that sense decision making might be slower than when you accept that you never will know everything and if you don't have the means you accept that fact easier. It might also be contradictory with freedom of handling by the subordinate commander base on the intent of the higher one. The higher Commander might be capable of "looking over the shoulder" of his subordinate. The danger of "micromanagement" enhances! This will influence the initiative of the lower commander. He might be afraid of taking the right decisions because he knows the "boss" is looking.
A106	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	OC 23 Infantry Company 2006-2008.  OC Initial Officers Training Wing 2010-2011.	I do not know how you define a C2-system that is build on Mission Command and at what level (Coy, Bn, Regt) you focus. But overall I think that military units should not rely too much on technology. In different technological developments like the Soldier Modernization Program the focus is on gathering even more information. During recent operations there is already an overload of information/intell that can hardly be processed by staffs and commanders. Despite all good intentions increased technology only requires additional personnel to operate and maintain all systems and hampers C2. It also implies that we have less "boots on the ground" and more personnel in staffs and compounds.
A107	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	Company Commander (4 years)	There is no 100% solution, Command is an art, Control is science. I see micromanagement as a big shortfall.
A108	Norway	Colonel Norwegian	CO Telemark Battalion	Nei, egentlig ikke dersom man ser bort fra høyere HQ's evne til detaljstyring ned på lavt nivå grunnet K2 systemenes mulighet.

		Army Infantry	2006-2008. CO NOR QRF5 RC-N 2008.  Inspector of Infantry and Cavalry Norwegian Army.	Oppdragstaktikk er etter min oppfatning basert på intensjon og en klar dialog mellom sjefer. Innenfor dette handlingsrommet skal/kan underlagte sjefer føse sitt oppdrag som de finner best. Hvis dagens og morgendagens K2 systemer misbrukes kan høyere HQ detaljstyre underlagte sjefer. Da blir det et mlsforhold mellom teknologi og oppdragstaktikk. Hvis det skjer er det ikke noe galt med teknologien, snarere noe galt med høyere HQs forståelse av Mission Command.
A109	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO 3 <sup>rd</sup> Battalion/N 1998-2001.  CO Cavalry Battalion/N 2002-2004.  CO Telemark Battalion 2004-2006.  CO NOR QRF1 RC-N 2006.  CO Norwegian Military Academy.	Technology can be a tool for good and effective Command and Control, but good and effective Command and Control is also more than technology. By delegating decision authority and allocate resources accordingly "technology" may facilitate better situational awareness and thereby a better basis for timely and appropriate good decision-making. The utility of the combined and joint forces can be optimized more easily than without technological support. However if the personal relationship between commanders on different levels within the task force or command is not properly developed and maintained, technology can also hamper the positive and offensive effects intended with Mission Command. The "thousand mile" screwdriver can easily remove subordinate commander's Initiative and make our ability to act rather than react impossible. Technology makes information overload possible and the human element in assessing available information requires knowledgeable and skilled staffs capable of evaluating and assessing in terms other than pure mechanical (yes vs no), the world is seldom black and white – there are lots of grey colors out there, and they are important to victory as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. There will always be information you would have liked to have, but cannot get as a commander. Technology may assist your staff in getting it, but this constant search for better situational knowledge must not postpone necessary and timely decisions. A commander must always keep in mind that war is basically a physical and mental endeavor, and those who are supposed to solve this task also need time to prepare and execute. The dilemma of when to decide is timeless and has lead to both victory and failure. If technology is applied with without forgetting its potential shortfalls and keeping in mind the challenging interface between the human element and technology, the potential shortfalls can be mitigated.
A110	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Signals Corps	CO Signals Battalion 2007-2009.  CO PRT 12 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2009.	Teknologi er ikke løsningen på alt, men er et verktøy uansett hvilken ledelsesfilosofi og metode en nyttet. Men, ordrebasert ledelse uten samband, kan medføre at striden stopper opp hvis ledere ikke vet hva de skal gjøre. (Dette er ikke et problem blant norske offiserer som ofte har plenty initiativ) Men som vi har sett blant enkelte offiserer fra andre land, de venter på ny ordre i stedet for å ivreksette. Dette skyldes manglende kommunisert intensjon fra sjef. Jeg har også opplevd enkelte systemer (sjef/undergitt) som ikke er i stand til å tenke flere trekk forover, og derfor ikke vil gi verken ordre eller intensjon, men vente å se. Dersom en venter og ser, og ikke har samband når mulighetene åpner seg, vil en ikke kunne ta mulighetene.  Mission Command; planlegging, utførelse Hvis en tenker mangler i teknologi i et Mission Command; Situasjonsforståelse; kan en få oppdatert info under utførelse av oppdrag, har en Interoperabilitet til støttet, støttende avdelinger, slideordnede avdelinger, kan en nytte UAV for økt oversikt Samband; rekkevidde, riktig type, vekt, batteri/strøm, riktig antall, Interoperabilitet (kryptering, frekvens, ), bør det være ett eller flere nett på hver mann? Kartsystemer, Blue force tracking, alle på nett? Afghanske enheter, svenske? Kartoverlegg, mål, tegninger, etc, shared mutual situational understanding,
A111	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	CO 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion 2004-2006.  CO NOR QRF2 RC-N Afghanistan 2007.	Mission Command in my view is a philosophy and if you believe in it and commit yourself to it technology only plays a positive role. Then technology allows communication between the commander and his subordinates and creates a better SA- and a better result. It is not the technology that hamper the mission command but lack of trust between commanders and subordinates.
A112	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO NOR QRF4 RC-N Afghanistan 2007.  CO Telemark	The human dimension will always be the most important dimension regarding any C2 system. Technology should only be regarded as a tool that enables the commander to systemize, assess outcome of head on head interactions, assess time and space factors, etc. Technology is also a tool that enables the commander to communicate his decision fast to many sub-commanders. In this respect, there are off course a lot of shortfalls in a C2 system built upon

			Battalion 2008-2010.  CO PRT 14 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2010.	Mission Command – as it always is with systems based on technology. If they fail to deliver, due to bugs etc, they will hamper the decision making process. Therefore the commander need to be sure that he has got manual back-up systems that he and his staff is trained in using. Systems that helps the commander to simplify the chaos on the battlefield to understandable information on which he is able to take sound decisions.
A113	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (4 years / 2 x Afghanistan).  CO Telemark Battalion 2010.	Yes. Van Creveld says it all...
A114	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (6 years / 3 x Afghanistan).	Per i dag er teknologien ikke tilfredsstillende for å lage et C2 meget godt system basert på MC. I stor grad er dette knyttet til at systemene ikke er pålitelige og driftssikre nok. Dette innebærer at man må ha et parallelt system om og når det teknologibaserte systemet svikter.
A115	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry and Cavalry	Company Commander 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion, Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (5 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Mission Command bygger jo på Cmdr's intent, conops, oppgaver med hensikt til underavdelingene, og kontrolltiltak parret med undergittes initiativ. Således er jo forståelsen av sjefens intenjon og undergittes handlingsrom essensielt. Ved å kommunisere elektronisk kan man mīste nyanser i kommunikasjoner som man kunne ha fanget opp ved å observere kroppsspråk, høre tonefall etc...dvs rett og slett se hverandre i øynene. Elektronisk kommunikasjon fordrer følgelig at personnellet kjenner hverandre minst like godt, ja kanskje bedre enn ved direkte kommunikasjon. Samtidig blir det enda klarere enn for at "Words matter", dvs presisjon i formuleringer og omforent oppfatning av hva en oppdragssformulering betyr.
A116	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	I dag har vi mengder av info tilgjengelig. Vi har BMS med all verdens info, vi har god optikk på alle lag og svært ofte har vi fly, helikopter eller dronestøtte. Vi hadde nesten alltid også med oss EK. Det betyr at det er uendelig med informasjon tilgjengelig. Shortfallen må ligge i at vi kan velge å utsette beslutninger fordi vi alltid kan få mer eller bedre info. Et annet problem ligger i at teknologi er avhengig av riktig inputs og at de fungerer. Det oppstår alltid problemer ved at ting ikke funker. Det kan være kritisk mtp ildkoordinering og manøver generelt. Likevel vil jeg si at jo bedre K2 systemet fungerer jo større er forutsetningen for at mission command kan lykkes.
A117	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Ja. Det faktum at en oppretter prosesser/prosedyrer som gjør at en stoler på at systemer er oppe å gå 24/7. Når det da ikke fungerer er det viktig å ha kunnskaper å ferdigheter til å ta prosessen ned til de enkle ferdigheter igjen. Eksempelvis, en prosedyre som omhandler gps må også kunne fungere hvis den ikke fungerer. Det samme gjelder eksempelvis bms/facnav....
A118	Norway	Major Norwegian Army	Task Unit Commander x 2 in	Ja, men man kan aldri stole blindt på teknologien. Jeg mener teknologi er til stor hjelp, men man kan aldri gå bort fra det gamle; face to face.

		Infantry	Afghanistan.	
A119	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan x 2).	Technology is only as good as the operator who must be human. Therefore it's key shortfall is the operator. Having too many feeds can also be problematic – “sipping from the fire hose” can lead to important command decisions being delayed trying to filter the enormous volume of information to find the key piece needed. An over reliance on electronic mapping and situational awareness tools may result in a degradation of the alternative / back up methods of paper maps and radio messages. If the electricity / battery power is limited or unreliable (often the case in expeditionary warfare) the system can fail at a critical time. So over reliance must be guarded against.
A120	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Afghanistan).	Technology can stifle the intent of mission command. If you are adhering to the commanders intend but as the same time C2 systems mean the commander is in your back pocket how can one really execute mission command? This becomes more of an issue if you are the ME, by definition the comd will use technology to follow your every step and is likely to intervene at the most inappropriate time.
A121	United States	Major United States Marine Corps	Company Commander (Iraq x 2).	Technology has the potential to create a false sense of situational awareness in higher headquarters. Real time ISR feeds provide information that at first glance may seem to give commanders in combat operations centers the same view as the units in contact. This will never be the case.

**Summary:**

The human dimension will always be the most important dimension regarding any Command and Control system. Therefore a strong and dynamic leadership is important. Technology should only be a tool that facilitates the execution of mission command, and enables the commander to gain situational awareness and communicate his decisions quickly to many subordinate commanders. However, there will always be physical pitfalls in technology and pitfalls in the soldier using the technology. While technology may allow us to act faster we need to be careful not to use technology in ways that it wasn't intended. Technology makes both information overload and micromanagement possible.

Even with poor systems an effective commander with well trained people can achieve mission command effects. It is not necessary the technology that hamper the mission command but lack of trust between commanders and subordinates. Even increasing technology will not give us 100% certainty, which means that the command and control system must be based on mutual trust, accept of uncertainty, and intuitive leadership.

<b>Q2</b>	<b>From your experience, what are the most important elements in a Command and Control system based upon mission command?</b>			
A201	Australia	Colonel Australian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander 1997-1998.  Infantry Battalion Commander 2004-2005.	The commander is central to the success, or otherwise, of mission command. He needs well trained subordinates, and this is his responsibility.
A202	Canada	Major Canadian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander Afghanistan 2008.	The human! People are the backbone of the C4ISR system.
A203	France	Major French Army		Each level of command have to keep its own freedom of action; ability to take decisions, exploit...to complete its mission.
A204	France	Major French Army		Freedom of action is the most important element in C2 system. Every level of command has to keep its own scope of responsibility and its ability to take decisions, to exploit to complete its mission according to the commanders intent.
A205	The Netherlands	Lt Colonel Royal Netherlands Marine Corps	CO Marine Training School.  CO Counter Terrorism Unit.	The level on which you operate is important for the answer of the question. Are you a company commander who is fighting and who's decision making needs to be quick, or are you a division cdr who's decisions will not have effect until the next day's? Freedom to act quickly and swiftly based on real time info by those who are on the scene. To a certain extend you must feel/see the environment in which you are fighting. On the other hand technology gives you also the opportunity to monitor the unfolding operation without the noise, misinterpretation, etc. Based on facts you

				might see things that in the chaos on the ground might be overseen. In that way you might support the on seen commander instead of overruling him as a senior cdr.
A206	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	OC 23 Infantry Company 2006-2008. OC Initial Officers Training Wing 2010-2011.	The only crucial element in a C2-system is reliable radio communications. In recent and current operations with enormous AORs these communication systems should be based on SATCOM in order to ensure good comms at all times. VHF and HF are too limited. At Plt and Section level a reliable Personal Role Radio is important.
A207	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	Company Commander (4 years)	It can improve your situational awareness.
A208	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO Telemark Battalion 2006-2008. CO NOR QRF5 RC-N 2008.  Inspector of Infantry and Cavalry Norwegian Army.	Muligheten til å snake med underlagte sjefer. Man må ha Push to talk samband som gjør det mulig for sjefer å snake sammen ved behov. Et Blue Force Tracker system er også viktig slik at høyere HQ kan monitordre og støtte med ressurser fra høyere nivå.
A209	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO 3 <sup>rd</sup> Battalion/N 1998-2001.  CO Cavalry Battalion/N 2002-2004.  CO Telemark Battalion 2004-2006.  CO NOR QRF1 RC-N 2006.  CO Norwegian Military Academy.	Command and Control is about leading human beings. It is never an instrumental act but about motivating others to assume responsibility, enjoys it and encourages all subordinates to assume this sort of attitude towards the mission. The human element can never be left out of the equation of Mission Command, and the relationship between the effective and the less effective way of conducting this command principle, lies in the way the supreme commander manages to develop mutual trust, confidence and initiative within his/hers command. Technology is a valuable assistant, but Mission Command can also function very well without if it is based on clear intentions, loyalty that runs ways, initiative and adaptability to changing situations connected to the overall intention.
A210	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Signals Corps	CO Signals Battalion 2007-2009.  CO PRT 12 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2009.	Tillit mellom sjef og sjef og sjef, den tilliten må strekke seg lengre enn et nivå, eks tillit mellom SJ PRT og SJ RC N er ikke nok, hvis TU sjef ikke har tillit til PRT sj og/eller RC N sjef. På samme måte er det ikke nok om det er tillit mellom SJ PRT og SJ TU, hvis lagførere/trs i TU ikke har tillit til SJ PRT.  Tydelighet hos sjefene slik at staber og avdelinger skjønner hva SJEF og SJEF ønsker å oppnå. Det er disse som stadsfester de gode intensjonene og tanker på papir både i oppdragsgiving og ikke rapportering. Ikke bare mellom de to, men også oppover og nedover. Dette innebærer mulig at en bør ha en god FELLES utdanning og ØVELSE der en lærer FELLES betydning/FORSTÅELSE av de samme ord og uttrykk.  En intensjon som faktisk gir noe, men som samtidig gir åpninger for undergitte til å finne hensiktsmessige løsninger basert på hvordan situasjonen faktisk er. En kan diskutere og finne gode løsninger på et kart, og en kan diskutere og bli enige om metoder for å nå et mål, men han på bakken som utfører til slutt, han opplever situasjonen på bakken, han kjenner oppdrag og intensjon, og han må ha tillit til hans valg der og da støttes. Det er knytningen mellom tillit, tydelighet og utdanning, og intensjonsbasert ledelse.
A211	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	CO 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion 2004-2006.  CO NOR QRF2	Trust between commander and a subordinate is the number one element. Thereafter training and practice in a mission command environment that should emphasize initiative and in the next turn build the necessary trust.

			RC-N Afghanistan 2007.	
A212	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO NOR QRF4 RC-N Afghanistan 2007.  CO Telemark Battalion 2008-2010.  CO PRT 14 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2010.	In my opinion the most important element is the commanders WILL. Without a strong will, the commander will be pushed into decisions that are presented to him by more or less inexperienced staff officers. The second most important element in a C2 system based upon mission command is the communication between the commander and his subordinate commanders. This communication need to be trained and exercised over time. In the end the subordinate commanders know their superior so well that they understand his Intent and will. In moments of confusion on the battlefield, and when communication is unable due to CIS shortfalls, this element is of utmost importance.
A213	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (4 years / 2 x Afghanistan).  CO Telemark Battalion 2010.	Trust in the C2 system, it has to be stable enough to make you sure that you do not need to double check the information. The system should provide you information that reduces the need to crosstalk information about positions, a BMS or blue force tracker is therefore a key part.
A214	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (6 years / 3 x Afghanistan).	Basert på min erfaring er sett muligheten for et (relativt) oppdatert situasjonsbilde. Dette gjelder både fiendtlige og egne. Dette gir i stor grad sjefen deler av den informasjonen han trenger for å kunne ta raske og egne beslutninger uten å måtte rådføre seg, koordinere (for mye) eller måtte motta/ vente på ordre. Dagens operasjonsfelt er så kompleks og har så mange faktorer og aktører at det er svært lett for en kompanisjef å måtte forholde seg til så mye at kjernefunksjonen hans som er å lede kompaniet forsvinner eller blir sekundært. Operasjoner på subtaktisk nivå har nå strategiske konsekvenser og sjefen trenger verktøy som kan gi han overskudd til igjen være kompanisjef.
A215	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry and Cavalry	Company Commander 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion, Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (5 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Vi opererer jo med et sjefs orientert system hvor sjefen skal visualize-understand-describe-direct-assess hele velen. K2 systemet har her flere roller: 1) Gi sjefen info nok til å visualisere og forstå, 2) Gi sjefen muligheten til å beskrive og lede, 3) Gi sjefen informasjon til å evaluere. Det er vanskelig å si at noe er viktigere enn det andre. Jeg tror imidlertid at felles forståelse av systemet og hvordan dette skal nytties i form av prosedyrer etc er med på å legge et godt grunnlag for å få informasjon til rett tid og i riktig mengde/oppløsning. Dette tror jeg bare kan oppnås ved samtrening og øvelser. Teori rundt teamarbeid sier jo at team som presterer har det til felles at de har en felles forståelse av målet, samt at det er enighet i hvordan man møter problemstillingen og hvordan avgjørelser tas.

A216	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Evnen til å dele presis informasjon hurtig. Evnen til å kunne nyttegjøre teknologien i planlegging og ledelse. Dvs milgeo ting. Å kunne lage og dele overlays inn på FACNAV for å ha felles referanse å snakke om. Presisjonen og oppløsningen blir betydelig større enn ved analoge metoder og papirkart.
A217	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Alle midler som understøtter avdelingens SA er viktig. Herunder gps/facnav/evne til å se det samme i hele enheten, evne til å kunne tegne en plan til sine underenheter er essensielle elementer/visualisering av plan eller hendelser i en operasjon
A218	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Task Unit Commander x 2 in Afghanistan.	Tilstedeværelse der det skjer. Se situasjonen og få sitrap fra sine underenheter.
A219	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan x 2).	Trust Mutual understanding
A220	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Afghanistan).	The ability to switch them off! Only joking... The ability to clarify, seek further guidance and call for additional support. If the situation changes to the level that your mission may change C2 ensures you maintain near real time SA.
A221	United States	Major United States Marine Corps	Company Commander (Iraq x 2).	The most important element in a Command and Control system based on mission command are leadership and training. Leadership provides the environment in which mission command can flourish. Training provides a shared set of experiences that facilitate implied communication and Intent based orders.
<b><u>Summary:</u></b> <b>The human aspect is the most important part of a command and control system. Leadership is never an instrumental act, but is about motivating others to assume responsibility, enjoys it, and encourages all subordinates to assume this sort of attitude towards the mission. The human element can never be left out of the equation of Mission Command, and the relationship between the effective and the less effective way of conducting this command principle lies in the way the commander manages to develop mutual trust, confidence, and initiative within his/hers command. Technology is a valuable assistant, but Mission Command can also function very well without if it is based on clear intentions, loyalty that runs all ways, initiative, and adaptability to changing situations connected to the overall intention. Some of the key factors are decentralized and dynamic leadership</b>				

Q3 From your perspective, how can uncertainty be decreased to an acceptable level without decreasing the ability to take decisions in time? How important are intuitive decision making in this matter?				
A301	Australia	Colonel Australian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander 1997-1998.  Infantry Battalion Commander 2004-2005.	Define 'acceptable level'. Each commander has a different risk threshold, and the enemy gets a vote. Each commander brings their own intuition to their appointment. Excellent staff and well trained subordinates assist the commander's intuition.
A302	Canada	Major Canadian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander Afghanistan 2008.	War will always be uncertain. We need to examine the environments we operate in more systematically. We need to adopt a mindset in which we fight for intelligence. This is all done with the view to maintaining a level of situational understanding that fosters timely decision-making. I see decision-making as a hybrid of analytical and intuitive styles that can be more timely with better understanding.
A303	France	Major French Army		Technology gives the commander who is not on the ground the same amount of data the CLC commander has. But only the chief on the ground can measure other data like: combat readiness, enemy momentum, enemy/friendly moral... Uncertainty is part of the war.
A304	France	Major French Army		Uncertainty is part of the war and part of this uncertainty could not be assessed by any technology. The chief on the ground is able to measure data like combat readiness, moral, esprit de corps, enemy momentum... Those data are assessed by a human brain and its feelings. The transmission of data about the battlefield could accelerate the momentum and the ability to take decisions and free some commanders to, take the lead on the front line.
A305	The Netherlands	Lt Colonel Royal Netherland Marine Corps	CO Marine Training School.  CO Counter Terrorism Unit.	This is an important element. You will probably never be 100% sure when you make decision. In exercises the level of uncertainty needs to be incorporated in decision making. Cdrs need to know each other. Relations need to be built on trust. Do not question decision making in the process, unless you are convinced that the subordinate made a catastrophic one. Give him you trust and coach him in the process during exercises.
A306	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	OC 23 Infantry Company 2006-2008.  OC Initial Officers Training Wing 2010-2011.	As your question implies there will always be uncertainty, friction and chaos. I don't think technology will decrease the amount of uncertainty, I think it will only provide more information that needs to be processed and assessed. Therefore the focus should not be on how to decrease uncertainty, but on training how to operate under uncertain and extreme conditions. By training under these realistic conditions commanders and their units will gain experience and this will improve judgment and swift decision making. Intuitive decision making is an important part of that.
A307	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	Company Commander (4 years)	There is no 100% solution during combat under time pressure. There will always be a big part of uncertainty. But better to make a decision with some acceptable amount of uncertainty than to do nothing. The question is, how much less than 100% is acceptable?
A308	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO Telemark Battalion 2006-2008.  CO NOR QRFS RC-N 2008.  Inspector of Infantry and Cavalry Norwegian Army.	Usikkerhet kan minskes gjennom intensjonsstyring og en klar forståelse mellom sjefer. Det må aldri være tvil om hva som er kjernen i oppdraget. Planen og oppdraget må være så robust/fleksibelt at det er handlingsrom for underlagte sjefer. Fortell HVA du ønsker oppnådd, ikke HVORDAN. Intuitive beslutninger er etter min oppfatning basert på år med erfaringslæring. Ergo er intuitive beslutninger basert på tilsvarende situasjoner og svært ofte korrekte. Man må ikke forveksle intuitivitet med det noen kaller magefølelse som er basert på langt svakere erfaringslæring.
A309	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO 3 <sup>rd</sup> Battalion/N 1998-2001.  CO Cavalry Battalion/N 2002-2004.  CO Telemark Battalion	It is always very important to keep the intentions behind the mission in mind, and by doing so also be able to assess possible second and third order effect of the decision. It is for example no help in bombing the target if second or third order effects of this decision are increased hostility among the people, and effect often overseen or ignored in both Afghanistan and Iraq. This is not new, and has always played a very important role in military decision making processes, but we seem to have forgotten the ability to think in all dimensions of strategy probably due to the vacuum of strategic, operational and tactical experience the Cold War possessed on us. (See Michael Howard's essay "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy" in his book "The Causes of Wars."

			2004-2005. CO NOR QRF1 RC-N 2006.  CO Norwegian Military Academy.	
A310	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Signals Corps	CO Signals Battallion 2007-2009.  CO PRT 12 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2009.	<p>Usikkerhet finnes i flere former. Hvordan en definerer hvilke usikkerheter en kan leve med, og hvilke som er showstoppere vet jeg ikke. Kanskje det er som med forskjellen mellom RISK og GAMBLE? RISK kan du komme deg unna med og overleve, GAMBLE er showstopperen. Det er nok eksempler i krigshistorien der en har ønsket å vente for å få bedre oversikt på fienden, en har ønsket å bygge en større styrke ift fienden med mer. Is i magen er et annet uttrykk. Handle før fienden, overraskelse osv er også gode prinsipper.</p> <p>Jo mer erfaring en har, jo lettere er det å kjenne igjen muligheter. Intuisjonen vokser, mønsterbasert gjenkjenning slår inn. Men, det koker ofte ned til; hva skal du oppnå? Hva er dine primære mål, og hva er eventuelt dine sekundære mål. I dagens operasjoner der det er langt flere aktører enn tidligere, er det som oftest en konflikt/uenighet knyttet til måloppnåelse. Som oftest er dette til de sekundære mål. Hva skjer når jeg gjør slik? En er nødt til å vurdere mulige konsekvenser av alle handlinger. Men, dette kan en gjøre i en planleggingsfase, der alle er med, slik at en bygger felles forståelse. Hvis vi begynner å dele ut ullaetter eller godteri, (og det kan ved første øyekast synes som en god ide) hva skjer da ift norske oppdragsgivere, NGO i området, barn som løper tett opp mot egne kjøretøy osv.</p> <p>Hva vet du om fienden, hva har han gjort før, og hvilke mønster finnes?</p> <p>Erfaringsoverføring fra en kontingent til en annen, lese rapporter fra forskjellige stridshandlinger osv vil hjelpe. Jeg husker jeg fant to graderte rapporter i en safe i MEY om ops i Ghowrmach. Jeg leste de nøye. Det går an å lære av andres feil, og det er med på å danne ballasten en trenger for å gjenkjenne situasjoner. Jeg forlangte videre at S3 m fl skulle lese. Jeg hadde nytte av de rapportene senere. Usikkerhet kan også reduseres ift størrelse på styrke, opptreden, overvåking, UAV, osv.</p>
A311	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	CO 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battallion 2004-2006.  CO NOR QRF2 RC-N Afghanistan 2007.	What is acceptable level of risk will vary from person to person. But education, training and experience will build self-confidence and pattern reconditions ability. This will reduce uncertainty, or at least help understand the uncertainty and the risk you take quicker, then making you able to make decisions faster.
A312	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO NOR QRF4 RC-N Afghanistan 2007.  CO Telemark battalion 2008-2010.  CO PRT 14 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2010.	The commander's experience is the core when uncertainty prevails. Inexperienced commanders will not be able to act intuitively when information is a shortfall. Therefore uncertainty needs to be reduced through relevant training of commanders. FTX-es, CAX-es, staff talks, brain storming, etc, that are designed to challenge the commander in all aspects of command is how to decrease uncertainty. Therefore, the way we prepare PRT commanders for duty in the NOR system needs to be changed. PRT commanders are still trained in the cold war environment by Bde North through their basic training with the Bde. They are rarely trained in how to crack the challenges they are facing as PRT commanders.
A313	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battallion and Telemark Battalion (4 years / 2 x Afghanistan).  CO Telemark Battalion 2010.	Leaders must be trained to take decision without knowing everything, I think that the training philosophy must reflect the fact that it is acceptable to make good and bad decisions. Evaluation should focus on why decisions were made and not how wrong they are. In this way intuitive decision making are being promoted.
A314	Norway	Major Norwegian	Company Commander	Teknologibaserte C2 systemer som bla oppdaterer og deler situasjonsbildet vil (om man stoler på det) redusere usikkerheten. Basert på min erfaring vil dette i

		Army Infantry	Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (6 years / 3 x Afghanistan).	<p>bete tilfelle kun være et system som gir deg indikatorer på situasjonen uten at jeg tør stole helt på det.</p> <p>Videre for å redusere usikkerheten er å sikre deg at undergitte og sideordnede har samme forståelse som deg. Dette gir dem grunnlag å forstå din situasjon og aktivt og presist kunne gi deg anbefalinger.</p> <p>Intuitiv beslutningstaking er et av de viktigste aspektene ved operativt lederskap. Evnen og viljen til dette er avgjørende for å utøve lederskap. Dette må trenes og dyrkes under seleksjon av sjefer og trening/ utdanning. C2 systemer og den ledelseskulturen (MC) som sjefen setter skal understøtte og skape forutsetning for hans beslutningstaking.</p>
A315	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry and Cavalry	Company Commander 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion, Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (5 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	<p>Dette har sammenheng med forrige spørsmål. Staben er jo etablert som et verktyg for sjefen i erkjennelsen av at ikke alle er Napoleon. Samtidig vil informasjonsbehovet og tempoet variere med operasjonstypen. Og akseptabel risiko vil være avhengig av flere faktorer. Jeg tror at en felles forståelse av situasjonen og sjefens hensikt vil være med på å lede staben hva gjelder å finne riktige beslutningspunkter i operasjonen, samtidig som de undergitte lettere kan gi sjefen den informasjonen han trenger for å ta beslutninger. Jeg tror faste og kjente prosedyrer for planprosessen er med på å sikre at alle har god situasjonsforståelse, følger logikken og kjenner sine ansvarsområder/leveranser. Bruk av doktriner og reglementer, og ikke minst lojalitet overfor disse er nyttige verktyg for å oppnå dette og vil kunne hjelpe utrenede avdelinger. Gode rutiner og prosedyrer bidrar således til evne til improvisasjon og intuitiv beslutningstaking. Et velfungerende K2 system er derfor først og fremst mennesker og prosedyrer, og sekundert den teknologien som nytes til å utveksle informasjon. Intuitiv beslutningstaking vil alltid være en del av battle command, da man aldri vil få svar på alle CCIR/forutsetninger. Til slutt vil jeg sitere Børge Gamst: "De beste metodikerne er ofte de beste intuitive beslutningstakerne".</p>
A316	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	<p>Man bør omfavne krigens natur med usikkerhet, friksjon og vold. Erkjenner man at dette er faktorer man alltid opplever vil man ikke bli negativt overrasket. For min del er det alltid tre ting som surrer i hodet under oppdragsløsning; hva er oppdraget (spesielt fokus på hensikten, men også oppgaven), hvor er fienden (hvor kan han være og hva har vi lagt til grunn for hans handlemåte) og ikke minst hvor er egne styrker, inkludert min egen avdeling. Man kan redusere usikkerheten ved å være sikker på hva oppdraget går ut på, hva som skal oppnås og hva som er sluttutsituasjonen. Ikke minst å sørge for at så mange som mulig i egen avdeling også skjønner det samme, med spesielt fokus på sjefene. Jeg tror og det er særlig viktig at man har trent inn et sett med handlingsmønster, SOP/TTP, som gjør at alle vet hva sjefen vil at man skal gjøre ved diverse handlinger. Hvis "alle" vet at ved kontakt sånn og sånn, skal man søke å dominere fienden medild, deretter manøvrere en enhet i posisjon og at man skal sørge for at fienden enten dør eller trekker ut til det føre til en trygghet. Dersom noen tror at man skal skyte seg løs, andre at man skal angripe og etter tredje at man skal ta dekning vil det skape kaos. Innøvde handlinger skaper også tid for styrkesjefen til å ta gode vurderinger.</p> <p>Mtp intuitive beslutninger tror jeg det blir lettere jo bedre man har gjennomført oppdragsanalyse og jo bedre en plan er formidlet til avdelingen. Ikke minst har erfaringsnivå mye å si. Eksempelvis for min del var det viktig i første stridskontakt å sørge for at vi gjorde det som var avdelingsens TTP/SOP, mens etter hvert som selvtiltalen og mestringstiden steg i takt med antall kontakter dannet det nye muligheter. Når jeg og avdelingen var blitt trygge på egne ferdigheter ble det mye oftere tatt beslutninger som ikke hadde vært verken en del av planen eller SOP, men snarere takisk klokt der og da. Blant annet satte vi opp et bakhold på en fiende vi antok ville angripe oss fra samme område for tredje eller fjerde gang. Vi klarte å manøvrere en styrke inn i skjul i mørke og når vi ble angrepet og fienden trakk ut gikk de rett i vårt oppsatte bakhold. Denne manøveren ville jeg ikke turt å engang tenke på ved de første 2-3 stridskontaktene.</p> <p>Samtidig tror jeg at forutsetningen for at en intuitiv beslutning skal bli god er at man har gjennomkjemper i handlingsmønsteret fra trening. Det vil si at man er i en situasjon man "kjenner igjen" og på en måte automatisk ser løsningen. Denne evnen oppnås gjennom kombinasjonen erfaring, trening, lesing og diskusjon (typisk TDG).</p>
A317	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Gjennom trening som innebefatter beslutningstrening. Både manøver med egne styrker men også beslutningstrening gjennom tdg lign. La enheter ta avgjørelser i den daglige trening (og planlegging) selv om alle detaljer ikke er deg gitt. Dyrk enheter som tar beslutninger, ikke de som avventer sine beslutninger.

A318	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Task Unit Commander x 2 in Afghanistan.	Not answered.
A319	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan x 2).	I believe intuition is made up of experience, judgment and training. An intuitive decision is not simply a best guess it is more rational than that with many inputs allowing you to make a decision with limited time. So intuitive decision making is key – the search for certainty is often futile, time consuming and counterproductive.
A320	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Afghanistan).	This all depends on the dynamics of the relationship you have with your commander. If a level of trust has been developed between the comd and his subordinates then decision making should remain intuitive and debriefing on those decisions made at that time should be sufficient. There will always be a level of uncertainty, more so than ever on the modern battlefield. An acceptable level is that which is acceptable by the comd. He is the one who is answerable to higher.
A321	United States	Major United States Marine Corps	Company Commander (Iraq x 2).	Uncertainty cannot be decreased. Organizations and leaders must be able to operate in chaotic and uncertain environments. No decision will ever be perfect. Intuitive decisions making is extremely important. Without it, combat leaders would quickly become overwhelmed as they tried to analyze every aspect of the situation before they will make a decision.
<b>Summary:</b> <b>Intuition is made up of experience, judgment and training. An intuitive decision is not simply a best guess. It is based on experience from similar situation and sound judgment rather than a stomach feeling. The search for certainty is often futile, time consuming and counterproductive. Trust is important to accept uncertainty and take risk.</b>				

Q4 From your perspective, does commanding a unit in combat situations require other skills than commanding a unit during peace time conditions?				
A401	Australia	Colonel Australian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander 1997-1998.  Infantry Battalion Commander 2004-2005.	Education is the key. Skills are the easy part. Any intelligent person can learn new skills. Commanders need to understand the art and science of war. This is a lifelong & continuous process. GEN James Mattis, USMC, is a great example of this type of warfighter who constantly develops and redefines his professional mastery.
A402	Canada	Major Canadian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander Afghanistan 2008.	No, leadership is leadership and the skills that a commander requires are relatively constant in any environment. Clearly, the commander must adapt during war but I believe fundamentally the required skills remain the same.
A403	France	Major French Army		Peace time conditions are the time between two deployments: train, educate the unit to prepare the unit for the combat situation. Commanders during the peace time have to be ready and trained for the combat. Leadership has just to be adapted to the situation but the fundamentals still the same.
A404	France	Major French Army		Leadership has just to adapt to the situation. The fundamentals still the same and the commanders are the same.
A405	The Netherlands	Lt Colonel Royal Netherland Marine Corps	CO Marine Training School.  CO Counter Terrorism Unit.	You must be capable of making a decision. Not making one is unacceptable in combat. See the elements on this topic in the other questions.
A406	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	OC 23 Infantry Company 2006-2008.  OC Initial Officers Training Wing 2010-2011.	I have not commanded a unit in combat conditions so my answer is not 'battle proven'. I think a leader should be able to use different techniques to lead his unit (situational leadership). Same as he needs to vary his leadership techniques depending on the experience, competence and commitment of his unit, NCO's and marines.  I also think that under extreme conditions and in times of stress and chaos (as during combat situations) it may be required that a leader is more directive in order to make things happen. However he also needs to be able to switch back when the situation permits.

				Since we train as realistic as possible during peace time conditions (train as you fight) I think a commander needs the same leadership skills and capabilities in peace time as during combat conditions.
A407	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	Company Commander (4 years)	Absolutely, although you always must try to conduct training operations under the most realistic circumstances there will more safety regulations enforce during peace time
A408	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO Telemark Battalion 2006-2008. CO NOR QRF5 RC-N 2008.  Inspector of Infantry and Cavalry Norwegian Army.	Ja. Evnen til raske beslutninger, til å være fleksibel og til å være tilstede hos underlagte sjefer er enda mer vesentlig i krise og krig. Evnen til å ta risiki (kalkulerete) må være store i krise/krieg dad et ikke vil være mulig å ha 100% SA i enhver situasjon. En stor grad av empati er nødvendig skal sjefen klare å motivere og stimulere avdelinger som har tatt tap.
A409	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO 3 <sup>rd</sup> Battalion/N 1998-2001.  CO Cavalry Battalion/N 2002-2004.  CO Telemark Battalion 2004-2006.  CO NOR QRF1 RC-N 2006.  CO Norwegian Military Academy.	The ability to command effectively in wartime is developed in peacetime. In war everything is difficult and even the easiest thing gets complicated Clausewitz stated. His statement is still very valid in my opinion. If you develop mutual trust, inspiration, loyalty that runs both ways, rewards initiative and make responsibility positive and attractive to everyone, the potential for mitigating shortfalls in war is better than ignoring these factors.
A410	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Signals Corps	CO Signals Battalion 2007-2009.  CO PRT 12 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2009.	Jeg tror det er vesentlig at din ledelsesfilosofi er forholdsvis lik. Det er tross alt et poeng å bli kjent i fred før en prøver i krig. Videre, jeg tror det er svært viktig å være seg selv i størst mulig grad. De som spiller et falskt rollespill blir gjennomskuet. Det betyr ikke at en ikke noen ganger er nødt til å spille en rolle, ifm forhandlinger tilsv.  Det er et langt større fokus på fredsforvaltning i fredstid enn i krig, og arbeidstiden er vesentlig kortere. Men, dersom en ikke driver en forvaltning og vedlikehold av kapasitetene i teatret har en ikke noe å sloss med. Det er undervurdert å ta seg til til å sørge for at forvaltningen også fungerer i krigstid. Det er ikke Commanders jobb når det begynner å bli hett, men det å tidlig bli kjent med forvaltningspersonell, la de skjonne at de er en vesentlig del av styrken osv, gjør at disse også ser hvorfor de skal prioritere enkelte ting før andre. De kjenner intensjonen!  Siden krigssituasjonene er annerledes viser det til tydelighet at det er viktig med evne til å håndtere uvante situasjoner med fleksibilitet. Denne håndteringen kan til en viss grad trenes i realistiske øvelser. Jeg tror det er kritisk viktig å være i god fysisk form, samt å få i seg god ernærings. En skal prestere på topp nivå i krig. Jeg tror kanskje sammenligningen med toppidrett er riktig. I fredstid holder det med god innsats og oversikt, i krig må det være nærmest perfekt, i hvertfall gjennomtenkt, forberedt, osv. Men, evnen til å være tilstede mentalt, sansene påslått, huske tilbake til intensjon/hensikt osv er kanskje det viktigste.
A411	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	CO 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion 2004-2005.  CO NOR QRF2 RC-N Afghanistan 2007.	(Have not commanded units in combat only in hostile environment) No, the skill set should be the same due to the fact that during peace time we train for combat situations. Difference in skill sets practiced in peacetime vs combat situations could have dangerous consequences. Train as you fight must still be the slogan and especially in a mission command leadership context this is important to build trust.
A412	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian	CO NOR QRF4 RC-N	Basically not, but in combat situations you need to reinforce some of the elements of your leadership:

		Army Infantry	Afghanistan 2007.  CO Telemark Battalion 2008-2010.  CO PRT 14 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2010.	- care taking of your men - the will to solve the task/mission.  In combat situations there will inevitably be a strong antagonism between these two core elements of your leadership. The threats are many (e.g. IED threat, that normally confine you to only move along cleared routes) and your troops may die if you do not eliminate the threats. But due to lack of equipment, skills and manpower, and the characteristic of the task/mission you are about to solve, you are not always able to eliminate the threats. YOU WILL HAVE TO SOLVE THE TASK REGARDLESS OF THE THREATS PRESENTED IN FRONT OF YOUR MEN. Then your <u>will</u> (and your ability to communicate your rationale for taking decisions where your troops may die) is more critical in combat situations than during peace time exercises, because during exercises no-one will die. The weighing between care taking and the importance of solving your mission/task is the art of leadership in combat.
A413	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (4 years / 2 x Afghanistan).  CO Telemark Battalion 2010.	Partly, but a commander need to be able to handle both situations. I think that it requires more skills than just handling peace time if you only think on garrison time. But also in combat situations you need to have met similar situations in training in peace time. The bureaucracy can be overwhelming in peace time, but is also something you need to handle in war time.
A414	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (6 years / 3 x Afghanistan).	I en optimal verden burde det sikker ikke være en forskjell. Hvis floskene train as you fight/ fight as you train var gjeldende ville det ikke vært noen forskjell. I den norske Hær er dette dessverre ikke virkeligheten. Viktige egenskaper som feks risikovilje, sluhet, aggressivitet og lojalitetsprioritet nedover er egenskaper som ikke er spesielt ønskelig i fredstid. På enkelte områder som for eksempel omsorgsvevne, helhetsoversikt og RAM er ferdigheter/ egenskaper like.
A415	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry and Cavalry	Company Commander 2nd Infantry Battalion, Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (5 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Jeg har aldri ledet enheten i direkte trefninger. Allikevel har jeg planlagt og gjennomført oppdrag hvor vi på forhånd mente det var stor sannsynlighet for å gå i kontakt/tap etc. Min erfaring er at det som funker under trening hjemme, også funker ute....kanskje fordi det er nettopp det vi har trent på! På kompaninivå og lavere er min opplevelse at behovet for direkte lederskap blir, enda større i slike situasjoner, dvs folk har et større behov for å bli sett og få en bekreftelse på egen plan og forståelse, dvs direkte kommunikasjon. Fra meg og opp på Bn nivå oppfattet jeg at det var viktigere å ha klare ansvarsforhold, og retningslinjer enn å kommunisere face to face med sjefen under operasjonen. Dog var det viktig at grunnleggende forhold var avklart face to face før operasjonen startet. Oppsummert mener jeg at det ikke er forskjell på ledelse i de ulike situasjonene. Det er snarere forhold som treningsstandard, erfaringsnivå etc som er utslagsgivende for hvordan lede.
A416	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Nei. Min oppfatning er i stort at lederskapet krever det samme både under trening og i operasjoner. Dersom man har fokus på å trenere rett i allefall. Hvis man ikke trener rett og aldri har tenkt gjennom alvoret i det man trener på vil det bli en forskjell fordi konsekvensene av beslutningene plutselig begynner å gå opp for en. Man kunne jo tenke seg at man oftere må "pushe" på folk for å få dem til å ta den risikoene som kreves, men min erfaring er motsatt. Jeg opplevde veldig mange ganger at det var jeg som måtte holde styrken min igjen. Veldig ofte fikk jeg anbefalinger om å angripe, ta nytt lende forfølge fienden osv der jeg faktisk måtte si nei. Akkurat som på hvilken som helst annen øvelse. En forskjell er det ikke. Ofte er treningen og øvelser av så kort varighet at man kan høste av energibanken gjennom hele perioden. Under en deployering som er relativt hektisk rekker man ikke å fylle på igjen og før eller senere vil overskuddet være borte. Det betyr at evnen til å ta beslutninger også må omfatte når man faktisk er sliten, irritert, lei og oppgitt. Man må da ha såpass karakter at man ikke tar lettvinde løsninger, eller bekvemmelighetshensyn fordi energibanken er tom. Man må være like profesjonell og fokuseret.
A417	Norway	Major	Company	Å gjøre noe annet ute enn hjemme vil være det samme som å kaste vå

		Norwegian Army Infantry	Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	utdanning på båten. Gjør hva du er opplært til hjemme også ute. Det fungerer!
A418	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Task Unit Commander x 2 in Afghanistan.	Nei, grunnlaget legger du under trening i fredstid. Har du ikke tillit til den avdelingen du skal lede, eller de ikke har tillit til deg vil det ikke fungere. I kamp vil da de dårlige beslutningene som tas kunne få dødelige konsekvenser.
A419	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan x 2).	Combat can demand difficult decisions but often the entire unit is focused on the mission, we are trained well for this very environment and there are few distractions. In barracks, it could be argued, unpopular decisions may require more moral courage because men have more distractions, family commitments and the benign environment can make these unpopular decisions often involving depriving men of time with their families more unreasonable. However, little can compare with the pressure of decisions in combat which may cost men their lives.
A420	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Afghanistan).	Train hard, fight easy. We always train our commanders to expect the unexpected, and train for the most stressful situation. Commanding in combat is no different; expect the worst, always consider "what if" and constantly conduct an estimate of what I would do if A.B. or C. happens. Expect the unexpected and know your men, strengths and weaknesses.
A421	United States	Major United States Marine Corps	Company Commander (Iraq x 2).	There should not be a difference between how a commander lead in peacetime and combat. The organizational behavior that is forced in training will be the behavior that is used in combat.

**Summary:**  
**In an ideal world there is no difference on leadership in combat situations and leadership during peacetime conditions because peacetime training is preparing the units for combat operations. However, because of peacetime regulations and focus, commanders are often evaluated more out of management than leadership. However, visual and strong leadership are key factors. In peacetime it builds trust, and in combat situations it prevent stress and misunderstandings.**

Q5 Based upon your experience, what would you describe as normal combat reactions and how can leadership help overcome combat stress.				
A501	Australia	Colonel Australian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander 1997-1998. Infantry Battalion Commander 2004-2005.	Caring for people is a constant for all people. Leaders need to ensure that people's individual, family, and personal needs are met, and then ensure education, skills, and confidence is set at appropriate levels. With these two foundations and individual has the foundations that allow them to cope with stress. Of course, people respond to stress differently, and a well informed leader can provide appropriate support when needed.
A502	Canada	Major Canadian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander Afghanistan 2008.	Normal reactions I have seen range from frustration to withdrawal to anger. Leaders must monitor their soldiers, keep talking to them, ensure they understand that what they are doing is important but always stressing that the individual is a key part of the team and we need him in the fight. In cases where an individual is not capable of carrying on, it is important to remove them but keep them within the unity. This must be done with the clear expectation they will return to combat. In terms of overcoming combat stress it is important to manage tempo and in the wake of an incident, talk, talk, talk but remain focused on the mission. There is a delicate balance between compassion and focus.
A503	France	Major French Army		Not answered.
A504	France	Major French Army		Not answered.
A505	The Netherlands	Lt Colonel Royal Netherland Marine Corps	CO Marine Training School. CO Counter Terrorism	The reaction will differ much for each individual. Besides debriefs within the unit the "formal" aid channels, the Dutch Marines have also embraced the UK approach to cope with combat stress. In the operational units we have a network of operational colleagues who will help to cope with combat reactions that remain after debriefs or formal evaluation steps. The power of this colleagues network is that it is always there for you and that you will probably

			Unit.	now the colleague who is a member. He has the same experience as you. These networkers have a formal status. We train our networkers to deal with combat stress. If they pick up signals that are too extreme they will take it to the next level of aid. Our experience until now is that they are very accessible and more important, acceptable within our operational units.
A506	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	OC 23 Infantry Company 2006-2008. OC Initial Officers Training Wing 2010-2011.	Again I have not commanded a unit under combat. I think normal combat reactions are emotional reactions and all persons will 'handle' those emotions in their own way. However I think it is important to create conditions where all your marines know it is normal that they have a certain reaction to combat and combat stress and that they can talk about those feelings. It is important to reflect and leaders (both NCO's and officers) play an important role to create the conditions to do so. Leaders should set the example and should be able to identify Indicators of combat stress.
A507	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	Company Commander (4 years)	Stress is a normal reaction for an unusual event. Leadership must be trained to recognize this reaction. During missions in Afghanistan we conduct debriefing after each patrol also encourage patrol leaders and junior officers to talk, listen and speak more often than usual with the marines after stressful situations.
A508	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO Telemark Battalion 2006-2008. CO NOR QRFS RC-N 2008. Inspector of Infantry and Cavalry Norwegian Army.	Lite erfaring her. Men, jeg tror at fysisk utholdenhetsbigger mentalt overskudd. Er man i form vil sjefen take stridsreaksjoner bedre en nom man er i dårlig fysisk form. En god stab med høyt kompetansesiv vil ta press av sjefen slik at han kan fokusere på de fremme.
A509	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO 3 <sup>rd</sup> Battalion/N 1998-2001. CO Cavalry Battalion/N 2002-2004. CO Telemark Battalion 2004-2006. CO NOR QRF1 RC-N 2006. CO Norwegian Military Academy.	<b>Normal reactions:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- fear,</li><li>- need for more information before you make a decision,</li><li>- Increased will to control even the smallest details,</li><li>- increased request for information during operations,</li><li>- increased search for info that fits into your plan with the possibility to oversee important details,</li><li>- increased possibility for group think within staff lot find supportive info that matches plan/execution,</li><li>- lack of trust if personal knowledge is not established prior to ops,</li><li>- lack of trust in own plan, ability to understand the situation,</li><li>- lack of trust in preparations and your units ability to solve the mission</li><li>- lack of trust in your own ability to assess the situation and lead.</li></ul> <b>Leadership:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- mutual trust and relation build up over time and developed through training and exercises</li><li>- physical fitness leads to mental capability and better stress management</li><li>- appreciate honest brokers that have faith in own ability and the unit they are a part of or supporting</li><li>- to develop freedom within intentions</li><li>- to accept differences and be able to discuss without becoming personal</li><li>- to be aware of normal reactions and try to mitigate the effects by own example, presence, confidence and personal appearance</li><li>- to constantly challenge own shortfalls through training, reading, professional relationships (pairs, subordinates and superiors you trust who can give you a piece of advice without further obligations)</li></ul>
A510	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Signals Corps	CO Signals Battalion 2007-2009. CO PRT 12 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2009.	Folk reagerer forskjellig, combat stress kan derfor oppstå på forskjellige tidspunkt. Jeg hadde svært begrenset erfaring fra fremste linje, men combat stress kan intatte på alle i teatret. IED trusselen er felles for alle som ferdes på veiene, og denne kan muligens sammenlignes med krigssellerne som lurte på når de ville bli torpedert. Som sagt, forskjellige reaksjoner, men jeg tror en skal se etter endringer i adferd. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Stille, i stedet for å snakke mye</li><li>- Pratsom, i stedet for å være rolig</li><li>- Rastløs, tent, gira</li><li>- Innesluttet, lukket</li><li>- Irritabel,</li></ul> I forebyggende øyemed, tror jeg det er avgjørende om alle har en forståelse for

				hvorfor de er i krigen, de kjenner hensikt og intensjon. Etter enhver aktivitet tror jeg en debrief i større eller mindre grupper er viktig. Jeg tror også det er viktig med anerkjennelse, spesielt fra sine sjefer i operasjonsområdet, men også når en kommer hjem til Norge.
A511	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	CO 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion 2004-2006.  CO NOR QRF2 RC-N Afghanistan 2007.	As mentioned in Q5 no direct experience direct combat and combat stress.
A512	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO NOR QRF4 RC-N Afghanistan 2007.  CO Telemark Battalion 2008-2010.  CO PRT 14 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2010.	<p>What I describe as normal combat reaction is such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- having difficulties in sleeping</li> <li>- difficulties in concentration</li> <li>- aggression.</li> </ul> <p>How to overcome these reactions may be divided in two areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) How you act as a leader: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Build close relation to your men and sub commanders during training, exercises and time in garrison. Walk and talk with your subordinates. Be with them as often as you can. You must be visible. This relation is a key when you enter the combat zone, or when you are supporting your subordinates in overcoming combat stress within your unit.</li> <li>b. Try to be present in/close to the combat zone yourself. Show your troops that you take the same risk as they do, and your sub commanders do.</li> <li>c. Only then you will be able to be recognized as a credible leader. Only then you are able share common experiences with your soldiers. And this is the most important part. Talk with your soldiers about your stress, and listen to what they have to say about their stress. Discuss, share experiences, show emotions!! When your soldiers are wiping, wipe with them!! But never loose control of yourself!</li> </ul> </li> <li>2) How you and your organization has prepared for overcoming the combat stress that always will emerge in your unit during combat: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Establish an atmosphere where openness and honesty is accepted by your troops</li> <li>b. Eliminate harassment within your unit.</li> <li>c. Eliminate the macho culture within your unit.</li> <li>d. Build systems for how to conduct de-briefing of your men. Make de-briefing an integral part of every operation. Debriefing is done on all levels of command.</li> </ul> </li> </ol>
A513	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (4 years / 2 x Afghanistan).  CO Telemark Battalion 2010.	Normal combat reactions I have seen is vomiting, paralyzed or "out of body" experiences. During operation being a good example, be there, follow up details and show that you have mutual trust in your unit is essential. Leadership starts already in selection, education and training of troops and units. Being prepared is the best way to reduce combat reactions.
A514	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (6 years / 3 x Afghanistan).	For uerfarne avdelinger og personell (f.eks støtteavdeling til manøver som havner i kampsituasjoner) er passivitet (freeze light) relativt vanlig. Dette kommer av at de er i ukjente situasjoner og blir usikker. I forkant av operasjoner vil realistisk trenings og visualisering/ forståelse av kamp være med å redusere dette. I kampsituasjoner vil sjefen i større grad måtte følge opp og vise et mer ordrebaseret lederskap og ofte detaljstyre. Redsel og usikkerhet i større eller mindre grad vil også kunne oppstå hos enkeltpersoner. Gjennom synlighet, vise ro/ være et eksempel og sørge for relevant informasjon vil dette kunne reduseres eller fjernes helt i gode avdelinger.
A515	Norway	Major Norwegian Army	Company Commander 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry	Som nevnt over opplevde jeg at folk hadde et behov for å bli sett, og å få støtte for sin handlemåte. Derfor var det viktig for meg å være tilgjengelig for folk i forkant av operasjoner. Det samme gjelder for så vidt underveis i operasjonen.

		Infantry and Cavalry	Battalion, Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (5 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Jeg tror det senker stressnivået at sjefen følger med og er i stand til å støtte. Dette kan oppnås gjennom samband, men sjefen bør på taktisk nivå være på slagfeltet for å forstå situasjoner og for å kunne plassere seg riktig. Dette vil ikke alltid være mulig i en COIN/PSO operasjon. Et viktig aspekt i fôr reaksjoner er det klima som settes i avdelingen, er det lov å ha reaksjoner?, lov til å ha følelser? Dette er i stor grad avhengig av sjefen, og jeg tror det er viktig at sjefen sørger for at avdelingen blir undervist i naturlige reaksjoner, har prosedyrer for å debriefe etc, samt gjør det klart hva som forventes av undergitte ledere og soldater når reaksjoner oppstår.
A516	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	<p>Jan Helge. Her har jeg litt reell statistikk fra min siste tur som kan være nyttig. Klipper det inn så får du se om det kan brukes. Avdelingen var i 15 stridskontakter fordelt på 40 dager ute på operasjon, stort sett på hold over 1000 meter. Den korteste på 250-300 m som var en sammenstøtsstrid. Dette fra en avdeling på 63 pax, hvorav 51 har svart på et utfyllende skjema.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 15% Redusert hørsel</li> <li>• 13% Tunnelsyn</li> <li>• 41% "Autopilot"</li> <li>• 8% Økte synsopplevelser</li> <li>• 38% Tiden "stopper" opp)</li> <li>• 10% Minnetap ifm hendelser</li> <li>• 3% Ut av kroppen opplevelse</li> <li>• 5% Forstyrrende tanker</li> <li>• 5% Falske minner</li> <li>• 3% Kvalme</li> <li>• 5% Skjelvinger</li> <li>• 50% Økt hjertetrymme</li> <li>• 3% Svimmehet</li> <li>• 72% Adrenalinrush</li> <li>• 33% «Energidump»</li> <li>• 5% 1000 m blikk</li> </ul> <p>Den vanligste stridsreaksjonen er dermed adrenalinrush, økt hjertefrekvens og en følelse av å gå på autopilot. Ingen av disse stressreaksjonene opplevdes som negative, men snarere en kilde til energi og fokus.</p> <p>Jeg tror det viktigste lederskapsmessige grepet man kan gjøre er å lære bort de normale stridsreaksjonene før deployering. Det betyr at man enklere kan kjenne seg igjen. Vi brukte Grossmans undersøkelse og statistikk – men sammenligning viser at det var relativt store forskjeller. Hovedsakelig tror jeg fordi Grossmans undersøkelse handlet om folk som opplevde plutselige situasjoner på kort hold der man måtte respondere hurtig og på refleks. Våre kontakter var veldig ofte forventet, planlagt og det var en viss grad av kontroll over dem. Dog må det nevnes at vi svært ofte hadde nedslag i avdelingen både RPG og PKM byger og i etterkant må vi si at vi var heldige som ikke tok tap.</p> <p>I praktisk lederskap tror jeg det handler om å bevare roen og vise at man selv nyter samme språk, samme teknikk og samme handlingsmønster som under trening og operasjoner uten treffinger. At avdelingen da kjenner igjen sjefen sin også når det røyner litt på. Jeg hadde ingen som sluttet å virke, men jeg hadde et makkerpar som skjøt seg tom for HK magasiner og tømte 550 av 600 MG kuler under et lokalt motstøt eller det som i gamle dager ble betegnet som en kontaktpatrulje. Lang historie, men de lykkes men havnet i svært heftig lld. Jeg stod ca 1 km unna og så hele hendelsen fra en annen høyde uten å kunne hjelpe. Når de kom tilbake så var de opplagt rystet, hadde kraftige etterskjelvinger og 1000meters blikk. De fikk en god klem, en redbull og deretter ordre om å fylle opp magasinene igjen. De var KTS i løpet av 15 minutter. Omsorg, krav og fokus på arbeidsoppgaver er viktig lederskapsmessige ting for å håndtere stress.</p>
A117	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	<p>Tap av egne soldater er en vanskelig variabel som du bør ha tenkt i gjennom. Slik jeg ser det er det ingen lokale operasjoner som kan være så viktig at tap er akseptabel, men det er det store bildet (ISAF) som gjør at det kan synes akseptabelt. Den enkeltes bevissthet rundt det faktum at militære operasjoner også er farlig for ens liv er også en grøl vinkel å ha med seg når en vekter operasjonenes viktighet.</p> <p>Dette med ansvaret er aspektet jeg vil fremheve. Du må lære å leve med dette. En måte du kan "dele" ansvaret på er å bygge team som understøtter og eventuelt kommer med innspill i prosessen. Deltagelse er viktig av andre grunner også. Ansvaret fordeles ikke av den grunn, det vil for alltid bli/være ditt.</p>
A118	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Task Unit Commander x 2 in Afghanistan.	Normale reaksjoner i kamp er litt vanskelig å forklare. Man blir skjerpet og får mer adrenalin. Når vi var nede nå sist var vi stort sett i kamp hver gang vi gjorde noe. Og det var en særskilt høy IED trussel. Og vi fant en mengde IDEr. Og det gikk av en masse IDEr mot ANA, ANP og US. Så det var vel egentlig en befrielse når det smalt, for da var du ikke i gang og slapp å gå og vente på den IDEn. En leder som kjenner avdelingen og som avdelingen kjenner. Og som er med avdelingen i alle situasjoner vil hjelpe avdelingen mtp stress og redsel. Det er i

				alle fall inne erfaringer.
A119	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan x 2).	Normal reactions are to second guess and judge yourself after the event with 20:20 hindsight. Guilt can appear if lives are lost or casualties taken. I think fear is a fairly healthy reaction and often unavoidable - as long as it's controlled I do not see this as harmful. The TRIM process is good at overcoming combat stress as is decompression.
A120	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Afghanistan).	As above realistic training always help. Knowing your men and developing a mutual trust. Never ask them to do anything you wouldn't do yourself. Respect their views, ideas and input, but remember you are the commanders and the buck stops with you, they expect that from you. Camaraderie, loyalty and good honest soldiering skills are all key.
A121	United States	Major United States Marine Corps	Company Commander (Iraq x 2).	Normal combat reactions are to revert to the highest level of training. i.e. Marines are forced to behave a certain way in training, they will exhibit that behavior in combat.

**Summary:**

In combat situations there will be mental stress. Realistic training, personal relationship, and mutual trust are keys to handle this. Also strong, dynamic and visual leadership are important. It always helps. In those situations it is important for commanders to lead from the front in order to create confidence and prevent misunderstandings.

Q6 How should individuals and units be recruited and trained in order to be able to execute mission command?				
A601	Australia	Colonel Australian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander 1997-1998.  Infantry Battalion Commander 2004-2005.	Education not training is the answer. The USMC CSC & SAW are the best education institutions that I have attended. The conference group based approach, supported by reading, reflection, and thinking, combined with practical exercises is an excellent model. People need to be imbued with a hunger for knowledge and they need to learn how to learn. We need agile, adaptive, and thoughtful future leaders.
A602	Canada	Major Canadian Army Infantry	Infantry Company Commander Afghanistan 2008.	I can't really comment on recruitment. In terms of training, it is essential to build trust within the team. Trust is essential to mission command. Furthermore, initiative must be fostered and honest mistakes underwritten. Lastly, soldiers and leaders must be encouraged to innovate and test new ways of doing things.
A603	France	Major French Army		Not answered.
A604	France	Major French Army		Not answered.
A605	The Netherlands	Lt Colonel Royal Netherland Marine Corps	CO Marine Training School.  CO Counter Terrorism Unit.	I would say you need independent thinking and acting soldiers who are not afraid that a wrong decision made will cost them their heads. Train this and give room for your subordinates to learn from their mistakes. Cultivate professionalism and initiative. Create an atmosphere of trust and respect for each other. Have exercises with each other and base decision making on information and arguments and not only on rank.  Go through decision making exercises so you will get inside the heads of your subordinates. Learn how, and based on what, they are going through their own OODA-loop.
A606	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	OC 23 Infantry Company 2006-2008.  OC Initial Officers Training Wing 2010-2011.	Recruiting is already very complex and with the current procedures we use in the Netherlands I think it will be nearly impossible to identify a competency that will indicate if a possible recruit will be able to execute mission command. Therefore the focus should be on training our marines and leaders in the execution of mission command. This starts by applying the principles of mission command (Unity of effort, Freedom of action, Trust, Mutual understanding, Timely and effective decision making) at the lowest level.
A607	The Netherlands	Major Royal Netherland Marine Corps	Company Commander (4 years)	Cultivated an environment where you really allow junior leaders to develop initiative and allow them to make mistakes.

A608	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO Telemark Battalion 2006-2008.  CO NOR QRF5 RC-N 2008.  Inspector of Infantry and Cavalry Norwegian Army.	Oppdragstaktikk er ikke nødvendigvis det enkleste for en vernepliktig avdeling. Forståelse og kompetanse må ligge i bunnen for at oppdragstaktikk kan nyttes, det rekker vi i liten grad på 12 måneder. Skal man gjennomføre oppdragstakk i krise og krig må også "det være en del av fredsdriften vår. Det er en forståelse og mental tilstand som ikke kommer plutselig, men må trenes opp i individet og avdelinge. Mitt spørsmål er om vår detaljstyring av fredsdriften faktisk er kontraproduktiv i forhold til dette. Her er jo US faktisk dårlige med sitt regelverke og detaljstyring i fred og delvis krise og krig!
A609	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO 3 <sup>rd</sup> Battalion/N 1998-2001.  CO Cavalry Battalion/N 2002-2004.  CO Telemark Battalion 2004-2006.  CO NOR QRF1 RC-N 2006.  CO Norwegian Military Academy.	I think you will find most of the answers to this question above. I am very into building relationships and being personal. This is in my opinion the most important issue when we are talking about building trust, confidence and a common responsibility that makes everybody involved and a part of the theme. It is often commented in team sports as football, soccer and handball. When a team is about to lose, or have lost a match, the lack of common responsibility in the team is often given as an explanation to the loss. Warfighting is team effort from the very beginning to the end, and therefore not different but very much more complicated based on the effects harm's way has on human beings. The importance of developing courage in all aspects is to me the most important thing we can do as soldiers. Courage in all respects both to handle the fear and to dare challenge the unknown and untold but clearly the very important little detail that may challenge the overall mission and intentions on higher levels. If everybody assumes responsibility, the enemy will have a smaller room to maneuver leaving us better capable of dealing with both the expected and the unexpected.
A610	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Signals Corps	CO Signals Battalion 2007-2009.  CO PRT 12 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2009.	Rekrutter ledere og la de rekruttere sine. (dette vil være vanskelig å beskrive for en volunteer force) Jobb videre med å utvikle felles forståelse. Tren på det du er dårlig på i passe doser, men forsterk der du er god. Bygg selvtilit. Kjenn egne kapasiteter, dette har overrasket meg før, at enkelte (spesielt i stab, men også på tvers av kompanier) ikke kjenner egne enheter godt nok. Hva kan de andre, hva gjør de, og hvorfor kan ikke gjøre slik? Mao, bli kjent med egne og andre egne. Bruk mye tid på å få situasjonsforståelse, IPB Forstå oppdraget, og jobb for at du og de høyere har felles forståelse. Tren slik du tror du vil operere i strid. Jeg har nevnt noe tidligere...
A611	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	CO 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion 2004-2006.  CO NOR QRF2 RC-N Afghanistan 2007.	During all training mission command must be emphasized, giving leaders (even riflemen) leverage and freedom to form their decisions based on own reasoning (within the guidance and orders given from higher level). Mistakes must be tolerated (and expected to happen) but also worked on lot to correct them. Emphasize must be put on building trust in the unit. Proficiency and hard training to meet high standards in every relevant skill is still a precondition for mission success and the most important building block for establishing trust and conditions for mission command. Personal knowledge between commanders and leaders on different levels in the unit is another issue that has to be worked on to set the conditions for mission command.
A612	Norway	Lt Colonel Norwegian Army Infantry	CO NOR QRF4 RC-N Afghanistan 2007.  CO Telemark Battalion 2008-2010.  CO PRT 14 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2010.	Recruitment: You need to recruit among officers that clearly show the following skills: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- ability to communicate clearly</li><li>- ability to state his/her ambition, objectives, end states etc.</li><li>- officers who also have the ability to listen to subordinates during discussion and planning sessions</li><li>- officers who are honest</li><li>- officers who are able to exemplify by going first</li><li>- officers who are capable of taking the initiative.</li></ul> Train: How you train officers and organizations in Mission Command is not very sophisticated. If you focus on using the same methodology in your peacetime (garrison) function you will be able to train yourself and your sub commanders every day. It is about taking responsibility, developing your judgment skills, stating clear objectives and end states, and allowing your sub commanders to decide how it should be done within the parameters you have decided initially. Unfortunately I can see that a large part of the reminding part of the Armed Forces do not think like this. I see that officers with a different mind set are put into central positions, where methodology from the economic era is prevailing.

				Control mechanisms are central in their thinking, and when it becomes difficult to control how we are doing the real business (preparing for combat) it becomes more important to control (and judge sub commanders) on parameters that are easy to measure (money spent, unpaid bills, how many leas-plan vehicles you've got in your unit, etc.,,,).
A613	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry & Mechanized Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (4 years / 2 x Afghanistan).  CO Telemark Battalion 2010.	To dare to do make decisions, also wrong decisions during training. Have a climate for honest response and feedback.
A614	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (6 years / 3 x Afghanistan).	Det er helt avgjørende at sjefer og avdelinger trenes aktivt og bevisst i MC. Dette krever et helt spesielt miljø der det er rom for sjefer å ta beslutninger og der de under trening kan og tør å feile. En avdeling som der MC skal gjennomføres må preges av selvstendighet, erfaring og høyt faglig innsikt/ nivå. Det er ikke bare sjefen som skal kunne bedrive MC. Det vil kun være mulig i en avdeling som har en kultur som understøtter dette. De må trenes i å gi anbefalinger, lese, tolke og formidle situasjonsbildet. Videre må det trenes i å vise initiativ og tolke/ lese sjefens intensjon og handle på dette uten å bli detaljstyrkt. Rett seleksjon av både befat og mannskaper er viktig å skape sjefer og avdelinger som kan utøve og etterleve MC. Selv om dette kan og må trenes og tilrettelegges er utvelgelsen av mennesker med de rette personlige egenskaper viktig. Optimalt må da seleksjonen, spesielt befat, i større grad identifisere rette personlige egenskaper enn resultater og (rett) bakgrunn.
A615	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry and Cavalry,	Company Commander 2 <sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion, Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (5 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Not answered.
A616	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Jeg tror på at fremtidens kriger blir vunnet av lagførere og troppsjefere. Det betyr at vi må bryte litt med gamle oppfatninger og gjøre disse nivåene sterkere og mer robuste til å håndtere ting selvstendig. Dette handler om problemløsning i hverdagen. Under trening og hverdagsaktivitet må ledere bli vant til å jobbe med friksjon og se løsninger istedenfor å være fokusert på problemet. Hvordan ting burde ha vært er helt irrelevant. En vogn som står eller et samband som streiket rett før avmarsj må man lære seg å leve med. Det er første del av forberedelsene: lære seg å leve med friksjon. Andre del av forutsetninger for å utføre oppdragsbasert ledelse er at man snakker samme språk. Man må ha entydig begrepssapparat på alt fra task-verbs til ildtyper, lendebeskrivelser, tid og målangivelse etc. Jo mer samtrent og enhetlig avdelingen er jo lettere er det for ledere å utføre mission command. Mine troppsjefere har sagt at de var svært fornøyd med dette siste runden ut. Jeg vektla sterkt UTS og PBP og hadde alltid med ledergruppa på oppdragsanalysen slik at alle hadde "aksjer" i hva som var vårt reformulerte oppdrag. Deretter dro vi handlemåten sammen, gjerne flere hvis tid, og endte opp på en plan som alle kjente til og hadde eleforhold til. Sjefene visste hva som var hensikten med sin egen enhet i hver fase og kunne selv sjongiere med oppgaven hvis det var nødvendig. Dette resulterte i en svært dynamisk manøver der ikke en enhet måtte vente på en annen eller for den saks skyld min kommando. Det resulterte i god cross-talk og gjensidig støtte. Sjefene hadde krysstalklar forståelse for sitt oppdrag og kunne derigjennom utføre mission command. Mtp rekryttering tror jeg vi har et relativt bra system i Norge. Gjennom både GBU/K og VOU som begge verdsetter initiativ, gode holdninger og ikke minst en god balanse mellom å være kriger og akademiker. Begge deler er nødvendig.
A617	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark	Selekte personell som evner å se løsninger fremfor begrensninger. Dyrk frem personell som er komfortabel i rollen som soldat. En som evner å se seg tilbake på hva han har lært for deretter å ta et valg i enhver situasjon han står i. Enhver soldat som stoler på sin utdanning og seg selv, har selvtillit nok og er sikker på seg vil ta gode avgjørelser. Avgjørelser som understøtter sin sjef.

			Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Treningen bør orientere rundt sjefens intensjon i hvert oppdrag. Sjefens intensjon må bindes opp mot hva " andre egne" gjør. Ingen militær avdeling/enhet gjør noe alene, noen støtter deg, eller du støtter andre. Å tren i kontekst, eller samvirke om en vil kalle det.
A618	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Infantry	Task Unit Commander x 2 in Afghanistan.	Når det gelder trening må avdelingen samtrenes og trenes på de verst tenkelige situasjoner den kan komme opp i i kamp. Dette må trenes på i fred.
A619	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan x 2).	Recruitment is affected by the organizations image / ethos - the image / ethos by deeds. Only by actually practicing what you preach will this occur and then one will feed the other as a higher caliber of man wishes to join and he then continues to re-enforce the image / ethos by practicing mission command. Training is key, but leadership that genuinely practices mission command is even more important.
A620	United Kingdom	Major The Royal Marines Commando	Company Commander (Afghanistan).	Progressive training, development and testing (crawl, walk run). Ethos of training to succeed is important if you want to get the best from your men. All men within your unit should be able to assume their bosses job, from the CO down to the youngest soldier. This is often mentioned but rarely executed. This develops trust, competence and confidence.
A621	United States	Major United States Marine Corps	Company Commander (Iraq x 2).	I do not think it would be practical to change recruiting for mission command. Training should be emphasizing decision making in uncertain environment. Accepting mistakes from subordinates, and forcing them to learn from it will help individuals build the tools that they will need to execute mission command.
<b><u>Summary:</u></b> <b>The most important with training is to establish relationship and understand each other. In order to conduct mission command it is necessary to develop independent thinking and acting soldiers who are not afraid that a wrong decision made will cost them their heads. This had to be trained within a command climate that gives room for subordinates to learn from their mistakes. Cultivate professionalism and initiative. Create an atmosphere of trust and respect for each other. Have exercises with each other and base decision making on information and arguments, and not on rank.</b>				

Other Comments				
A705	The Netherlands	Lt Colonel Royal Netherland Marine Corps	CO Marine Training School. CO Counter Terrorism Unit,	In relation to Mission Command (MC) I think we should ask ourselves the question if MC is still the way ahead. Using MC, commanders tell their subordinates what they have to do, but not how to do it. However recent COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown a different trend. COM ISAF for example issued detailed Directives and Guidelines. In Afghanistan units on the ground know far better than the higher command (COM RCS or COM ISAF) what has to be done in their AOR. So subordinate commanders can decide on 'what' to do as long as all operations fit in the overall mission and framework. From the higher levels of command more emphasize is put on the 'how'. How to conduct convoy operations, how to train the local security forces and how to interact with the local population. So in my opinion there is a shift from Mission Command to Executive Command.
A710	Norway	Colonel Norwegian Army Signals Corps	CO Signals Battalion 2007-2009. CO PRT 12 Meymaneh Afghanistan 2009.	Kulturforskjellene er tilstede. Utdanning, felles forståelse og begrepsavklaringer blir viktigere i multinasjonale enheter enn i nasjonale. Samtidig, med nok trening og felles opplevelse, er det utrolig hvordan en kan få en gruppe til å fungere under press.
A716	Norway	Major Norwegian Army Cavalry	Company Commander Armored Battalion and Telemark Battalion (3 years / 1 x Afghanistan).	Jeg lærte en gang en modell, men jeg husker ikke hvor fra. Den handler om fighter – leader. I korte trekk sier den at jo mer fighter du er jo mindre leader og vice versa. Dette tror jeg er en veldig god modell for å forstå sin rolle som leder. Dersom man blir for opptatt med eget våpen vil man ikke være istrand til å lede. En bataljonsjef USMC vi hadde foredrag av på EWS sa at han så dette problemet og beordret sine kpsjefer til å legge vekk rifle og kun gå med pistol. Han sa at på grunn av at de var for opptatt av å skyte sitt eget våpen ble bataljonens fremdrift skadeldende grunnet treg og mangelfull K2.
A719	United Kingdom	Major The Royal	Company Commander	Command Positioning and the nuance of modern warfare The physical distance from the combat situation / front line that distributed

		<p>Marines Commando</p> <p>(Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan x 2).</p>	<p>leadership enables can be a double edged sword. The decisions may be able to be made in a more conducive environment where calm heads and the pressure of personal survival and casualties are reduced. However the intangible feel for how the battle is turning or how the atmospherics have just deteriorated in a village can be missed leading to misunderstandings and incorrect reading of a situation. This of course stems from the age old debate of the "position of the commander" – close enough to understand but not actually embroiled in the fight and unable to command and control more widely.</p> <p><b>Shared Risk</b></p> <p>Linked to the point above is the issue of shared risk. If the commander conducts distributed leadership he is removed from the front line and most of his men. I believe demonstrably shared risk is an important element of the moral component of leadership. In my experience, men react more positively to a commander who they believe is "in this thing with them", have a genuine concern for their safety (without compromising mission success) and are also seen to be sharing the hardships of combat. This also aids the commander who will have a better understanding of his men, their combat effectiveness and actually be present to give orders in person. By sharing risk you can also generate trust and mutual understanding far more effectively than by remote through advances in technology.</p> <p>My instinct in this is similar to yours and I would endorse your earlier comment that an over reliance on sophisticated command, control and information systems will be counterproductive and it is still necessary to invest a lot of time and effort into education and training combat commanders, even though technology will make it possible to remove commanders from the frontline.</p>
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## Appendix D: Acronyms

BMS	Battlefield Management Systems
C2	Command and Control
C2IS	Command, Control and Information Systems
CF	Coalition Forces
COIN	Counter Insurgency
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HNSF	Host Nation Security Forces
IA	Inter Agency
IS	Information Systems
OLOW	Operational Level of War
OODA Loop	Observation – Orientation – Decision – Action (Decision Making Cycle - Boyd Cycle)
SASO	Stability and Support Operations
SLOW	Strategic Level of War
TLOW	Tactical Level of War
3BW	Three Block War
4BW	Four Block War

## Appendix E: Definitions

### Distributed Operations:

Distributed Operations is a form of maneuver warfare where small, highly capable units spread across a large area of operations will create an advantage over an adversary through the deliberate use of separation and coordinated, independent tactical actions. DO units will use close combat or supporting arms to disrupt the enemy's access to key terrain and avenues of approach. This type of warfare will be dependent on well trained and professional small unit leaders, focused and energetic training of small units and more robust communications and tactical mobility assets for those smaller units. A greater focus will also be placed on language and cultural training.<sup>23</sup>

### Mission Command:

Mission Command is a style of military command, derived from the Prussian-pioneered Mission-type tactics doctrine, promoting relatively decentralised subsidiarity of command, freedom and speed of action, and initiative, within certain constraints. Subordinates, understanding the commander's intentions, their own missions and the context of those missions, are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it needs to be achieved. They then decide within their delegated freedom of action how best to achieve their missions. Mission Command is closely related to civilian management concept of empowerment. It is advocated, but not always used by the Chain of command in the United States, Canadian, Dutch and the British Army.<sup>24</sup>

### Three Block War:

The Three Block War is a concept described by US Marine General Charles Krulak in the late 1990s to illustrate the complex spectrum of challenges likely to be faced by soldiers on the modern battlefield. In Krulak's example, soldiers may be required to conduct full scale military action, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid within the space of three contiguous city blocks. The thrust of the concept is that modern militaries must be trained to operate in all three conditions simultaneously, and that to do so, leadership training at the lowest levels needs to be high. The latter condition caused Krulak to invoke what he called "strategic corporals"; low-level unit leaders able to take independent action and make major decisions.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Wikipedia

<sup>24</sup> Wikipedia

<sup>25</sup> Wikipedia

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- <sup>1</sup> U. S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1.0, *Operations*, (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 27 Sept 2001), p. A1-A4.
- <sup>2</sup> U. S. Marine Corps, MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 4 Oct 1996), p. 35.
- <sup>3</sup> U. S. Marine Corps, MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, p. 63-65.
- <sup>4</sup> U. S. Marine Corps, MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, p. 96.
- <sup>5</sup> U. S. Marine Corps, MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, p. 122.
- <sup>6</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Ed and trans), (Princeton University Press, Indexed Edition, Princeton, New Jersey 1989), p. 75.
- <sup>7</sup> Stephen W. Sears, *Gettysburgh*, (Mariner Books, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 2004), p. 427.
- <sup>8</sup> Irregular warfare is not a new phenomenon. Small wars have been fought for centuries.
- <sup>9</sup> Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die: the Untold Story of Operation Anaconda*, (Berkley Caliber Books, New York, 2005), Part 1: IPB, Chapter 3.
- <sup>10</sup> U. S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1.0, *Operations*, p. B1-B4: "Mass, Objective, Offensive, Security, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Surprise, Simplicity."
- <sup>11</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 75.
- <sup>12</sup> AJP-3.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*, (2009), p. 3-1.
- <sup>13</sup> U. S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1.0, *Operations*, p. A1-A4.
- <sup>14</sup> FM 3-0, *Operations*, in: Smartbook: Guide to FM 3-0 Operations (2008) and the six Warfighting Funktions, (4<sup>th</sup> Rev. Ed., The Lightening Press), p. 1-52 – 1-53.
- <sup>15</sup> Forsvarsstaben, *Forsvarets Doktrine for Landoperasjoner*, (Forsvarsstaben, 2004), p. 55.
- <sup>16</sup> U. S. Marine Corps, MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, p. 35.
- <sup>17</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 1, Chapter 6.
- <sup>18</sup> Martin van Crefeld, *Command in War*, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985), p. 269.
- <sup>19</sup> U. S. Marine Corps, MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, p. 122.
- <sup>20</sup> MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 20 Jun 1997), p. 72.
- <sup>21</sup> H. T. Heyden, Ed., *Warfighting; Maneuver Warfare in the U. S. Marine Corps*, (Greenhill Books, London, 1995), p. 19.
- <sup>22</sup> One of the articles in Bill Linds "Maneuver Warfare Handbook" from 1984 is about the innovation of the German *Stormtroop tactics*.
- <sup>23</sup> Stephen W. Sears, *Chancellorsville*, (Mariner Books, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1996), p. 235.
- <sup>24</sup> Dinter, Elmar, *Hero or Coward; Pressure Facing the Soldiers in Battle*, (London: Gainsboro House, 1985).
- <sup>25</sup> Verdens Gang Nettavisen, <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/artikkelen.php?artid=10033166>
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- <sup>27</sup> Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident, *Vol 1 – The Report of Investigation*, (14. Mar 1979), p. 2-4 – 2-6.